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ABSTRACT
We propose the systemic risk beta as a measure for financial companies’ contribu-
tion to systemic risk given network interdependence between firms’ tail risk expo-
sures. Conditional on statistically pre-identified network spillover effects and market
and balance sheet information, we define the systemic risk beta as the time-varying
marginal effect of a firm’s Value-at-risk (VaR) on the system’s VaR. Suitable statis-
tical inference reveals a multitude of relevant risk spillover channels and determines
companies’ systemic importance in the U.S. financial system. Our approach can be
used to monitor companies’ systemic importance allowing for a transparent macro-
prudential regulation.
Keywords: Systemic risk contribution, systemic risk network, Value at Risk, net-
work topology, two-step quantile regression, time-varying parameters
JEL classification: G01, G18, G32, G38, C21, C51, C63
The financial crisis 2007-2009 has shown that cross-sectional dependencies between as-
sets and credit exposures can cause even small risks of individual banks to cascade and
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build up to a substantial threat for the stability of an entire financial system.1 Under certain
economic conditions, company-specific risk cannot be appropriately assessed in isolation
without accounting for potential risk spillover effects from other firms. In fact, it is not just
its size and idiosyncratic risk but also its interconnectedness with other firms which deter-
mines a company’s systemic relevance i.e., its potential to significantly increase the risk
of failure of the entire system – which we denote as systemic risk.2 While there is a broad
consensus that any prudential regulatory policy should account for the consequences of
network interdependencies in the financial system, in practice, however, any attempt of
a transparent implementation must fail, as long as suitable empirical measures for firms’
individual risk, risk spillovers and systemic relevance are not available. In particular, it
is unclear how to quantify individual risk exposures and systemic risk contributions in an
appropriate but still parsimonious and empirically tractable way for a prevailing underly-
ing network structure. And there is an apparent need for respective empirically feasible
and forward-looking measures which only rely on available data of publicly disclosed
balance sheet and market information but still account for the complexity of the financial
system.
A general empirical assessment of systemic relevance cannot build on the vast theo-
retical literature of financial network models and financial contagion, since these results
typically require detailed information on intra-bank asset and liability exposures (see, e.g.,
Allen and Gale, 2000, Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet, 2000, and Leitner, 2005). Such data
is generally not publicly disclosed and even regulators can only collect partial informa-
tion on some sources of inter-bank linkages. Available empirical studies linked to this
literature can therefore only partially contribute to a full picture of companies’ systemic
relevance as they focus on particular parts of specific markets at a particular time under
particular financial conditions (see, e.g., Upper and Worms, 2004, and Furfine, 2003, for
Germany and the U.S., respectively).3 Furthermore, assessing risk interconnections on the
1For a thorough description of the financial crisis, see, e.g., Brunnermeier (2009).
2Bernanke (2009) and Rajan (2009) stress the danger induced by institutions which are “too intercon-
nected to fail” or ”too systemic to fail” in contrast to the insufficient focus on firms which are simply “too
big too fail”.
3See also Cocco, Gomes, and Martins (2009) for parts of the financial sector in Portugal, Elsinger,
Lehar, and Summer (2006) for Austria, and Degryse and Nguyen (2007) for Belgium. A rare exception is
the unique data set for India with full information on the intra-banking market studied in Iyer and Peydrió
(2011).
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basis of multivariate failure probability distributions has proven to be statistically compli-
cated without using restrictive assumptions driving the results (see, e.g., Boss, Elsinger,
Summer, and Thurner, 2004, or Zhou, 2009, and references therein). Finally, for regu-
lators it is often unclear, how the typically complex structures ultimately translate into
dynamic and predictable measures of systemic relevance.
The objective of this paper is to develop an easily and widely applicable measure of
a firm’s systemic relevance, explicitly accounting for the company’s interconnectedness
within the financial sector. We assess companies’ risk of financial distress on the basis
of share price information, which directly incorporates market perceptions of a firm’s
prospects, and publicly accessible market as well as balance sheet data. As for risk in-
terconnectedness only dependencies in extreme tails of asset return distributions matter,
we base our measure on extreme conditional quantiles of corresponding return distribu-
tions quantifying the risk of distress of individual companies and of the entire system
respectively. In this sense, our setting builds on the concept of conditional Value-at-Risk
(VaR), which is a popular and widely accepted measure for tail risk.4 For each firm,
we identify its so-called relevant (tail) risk drivers as the minimal set of macroeconomic
fundamentals, firm-specific characteristics and risk spillovers from competitors and other
companies driving the company’s VaR. Detecting of with whom and how strongly any
institution is connected allows to construct a tail risk network of the financial system. A
company’s contribution to systemic risk is then defined as the induced total effect of an
increase in its individual tail risk on the VaR of the entire system, conditional on the firm’s
position within the financial network as well as overall market conditions. Furthermore,
we obtain a reliable measure of a company’s idiosyncratic risk in the presence of network
spillover effects by assessing its conditional VaR depending on respective tail risk drivers.
The underlying statistical setting is a two-stage quantile regression approach: In the
first step, firm-specific VaRs are estimated as functions of firm characteristics, macroeco-
nomic state variables as well as tail risk spillovers of other banks which are captured by
4Note that the VaR is a coherent risk measure in realistic market settings, i.e., in cases of return distri-
butions with tails decaying faster than those of the Cauchy distribution, see Garcia, Renault, and Tsafack
(2007). In principle, our methodology could also be adapted to other tail risk measures such as, e.g., ex-
pected shortfall. Such a setting, however, would involve additional estimation steps and complications,
probably inducing an overall loss of accuracy in results given the limited amount of available data.
3
loss exceedances. Hereby, the major challenge is to shrink the high-dimensional set of
possible cross-linkages between all financial firms to a feasible number of relevant risk
connections. We address this issue statistically as a model selection problem in individual
institution’s VaR specifications which we solve in a pre-step. In particular, we make use of
novel Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) techniques (see Belloni
and Chernozhukov, 2011) which allows us to identify the relevant tail risk drivers for each
company in a fully automatic way. The resulting identified risk interconnections are best
represented in terms of a network graph as illustrated in Figure 1 (and discussed in more
detail in the remainder of the paper) for the system of the 57 largest U.S. financial compa-
nies. In the second step, for measuring a firm’s systemic impact, we individually regress
the VaR of a value-weighted index of the financial sector on the firm’s estimated VaR
while controlling for the pre-identified company-specific risk drivers as well as macroe-
conomic state variables. We derive standard errors which explicitly account for estimation
errors resulting from the pre-estimation of regressors in quantile relations. As the gener-
ally available sample sizes of balance sheet and macroeconomic information make the use
of large-sample inference questionable, we provide (non-standard) bootstrap methods to
construct finite-sample-based parameter tests.
We determine a company’s systemic risk contribution as the marginal effect of its in-
dividual VaR on the VaR of the system. In analogy to an (inverted) asset pricing relation-
ship in quantiles we call the measure systemic risk beta. It corresponds to the system’s
marginal risk exposure due to changes in the tail of a firm’s loss distribution. For com-
paring the systemic relevance of companies across the system, however, it is necessary to
compute the induced total increase in systemic risk. We therefore rank companies accord-
ing to their ”standardized” systemic risk beta corresponding to the product of a company’s
systemic risk beta and its VaR. The systemic risk beta - and therefore also its standardized
version - is modeled as a function of firm-specific characteristics, such as leverage, matu-
rity mismatch and size. Accordingly, a firm’s tail risk effect on the system can vary with
its economic conditions and/or its balance sheet structure changing its marginal systemic
importance even though its individual risk level might be identical at different time points.
4
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Figure 1: Risk network of the U.S. financial system schematically highlighting key companies
in the system with boxes increasing with average size (measured as market valued total assets) in
2000-2008. Details on all other firms in the system only appearing as unlabeled shaded nodes will
be provided later in the paper. Depositories are marked in red, broker dealers in green, insurance
companies in black, others in blue. An arrow pointing from firm j to firm i reflects an impact of
extreme returns of j on the VaR of i (V aRi) which is identified as being relevant employing statis-
tical selection techniques. VaRs are measured in terms of 5%-quantiles of the return distribution.
The effect of j on i is measured in terms of the impact of an increase of the return Xj on V aRi
given Xi is below its 10% quantile, i.e., i’s so-called loss exceedance. The size of the respective
increase in V aRj given a 1% increase of the loss exceedance of i is reflected by the thickness of
the arrow where we distinguish between three categories: thin arrows display an increase up to
0.4, medium size of 0.4-0.8, and thick arrows of greater than 0.8. The graph is constructed such
that the total length of all arrows in the system is minimized. Accordingly, more interconnected
firms are located in the center.
Our empirical results reveal a high degree of tail risk interconnectedness among U.S. fi-
nancial institutions. We clearly detect channels of potential risk spillovers which super-
vision authorities but also risk managers must not ignore. Based on the topology of the
systemic risk network, we can categorize firms into three broad groups according to their
type and extent of connectedness with other companies: main risk transmitters, risk re-
cipients and companies which both receive and transmit tail risk. From a regulatory point
of view, the second group of pure risk recipients has the least systemic impact. Moni-
toring their condition, however, might still convey important accumulated information on
potentially hidden problems in those companies which act as their risk drivers. In any
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Figure 2: Systemic relevance of five exemplary firms in the U.S. financial system at two time
points before and at the height of the financial crisis, 2008. Systemic relevance is measured in
”systemic risk betas” quantifying the marginal increase of the VaR of the system given an increase
in a bank’s VaR while controlling for the bank’s pre-identified risk drivers. All VaRs are computed
at the 5% level and are by definition positive. We depict respective “standardized” versions of
the systemic risk beta representing the total effect on systemic risk induced by individual VaRs.
Connecting lines are just added to graphically highlight changes between the two time points but
do not mark real evolutions. The size of the elements in the graph reflects the size of the VaR of
the respective company at each of the two time points. We use the following scale: the element
is k·standard size with k = 1 for V aR ≤ 0.05, k = 1.5 for V aR ∈ (0.05, 0.1], k = 2 for
V aR ∈ (0.1, 0.15], k = 3 for V aR ∈ (0.2, 0.25] and k = 5.5 for V aR ∈ (0.65, 0.7]. Attached
numbers inside the figure mark the position of the respective company in an overall ranking of the
57 largest U.S. financial companies for each of the two time points.
case, the internal risk management of these companies should account for the possible
threat induced by the large degree of dependence on others. In particular, assessing their
full risk exposure requires network augmented risk measures as our VaR with preselected
network risk drivers. The highest attention of supervision authorities should be attracted
by firms which mainly act as risk drivers for others in the system. These contain firms
in the center of the network which appear as “too interconnected to fail”, but even more
so, large depositories at the boundary which drive a small number of firms in the cen-
ter of the system. While the systemic risk network yields qualitative information on risk
channels and roles of companies within the financial system, estimates of systemic risk
betas allow to quantify the resulting individual systemic relevance and thus complement
the full picture. Ranking companies based on (standardized) systemic risk betas shows
that large depositories are particularly risky. After controlling for all relevant network
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effects, they have the overall strongest impact on systemic risk and should be regulated
accordingly. Confirming general intuition, time evolutions of (standardized) systemic risk
betas indicate that most companies’ systemic risk contribution sharply increases during
the financial crisis. These effects are particularly pronounced for firms, such as, e.g., AIG,
which indeed got into financial distress during the crisis and are clearly (ex post) iden-
tified as being systemically risky by our approach. Figure 2 exemplarily illustrates the
evolutions of their marginal systemic contributions – as reflected by systemic risk betas
– as well as their exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk – as quantified by their VaR. A de-
tailed pre-crisis case study confirms the validity of our methodology as firms such as, e.g.,
Lehman Brothers are ex-ante identified as being highly systemically relevant. It is well-
known that their subsequent failure has indeed had a huge impact on the stability of the
entire financial system. Likewise, the extensive bail-outs of AIG, Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae can be justified given their high systemic risk betas and high interconnectedness by
the end of 2007.
Our paper relates to several strands of recent empirical literature on systemic risk con-
tributions. Closest to our work is White, Kim, and Manganelli (2010) who propose a
bivariate vector-autoregressive system of each company’s VaR and the system VaR. They
capture time variations in tail risk in a pure time series setting which does not account for
mutual dependencies and network effects. In contrast, our model is more structural as it
models tail risk in dependence of economic state variables and network spillovers which
automatically account for periods of turbulence when predicting the systemic relevance.
Similarly, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) build on VaR to a construct systemic risk
measure without addressing network interconnections and balance sheet characteristics
driving individual risk exposures. Moreover, our paper complements papers which mea-
sure a company’s systemic relevance by focusing on the size of potential bail-out costs,
such as Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) and Brownlees and Engle
(2011). Such approaches cannot detect spillover effects driven by the topology of the risk
network and might under-estimate the systemic importance of small but very intercon-
nected companies. Moreover, while Brownlees and Engle (2011) study the situation of an
individual firm given that the system is under distress, we investigate the reverse relation
and measure the effect on the system given an individual firm is in financial trouble. In
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the same way, we also complement macroeconomic approaches taking a more aggregated
view as, e.g., the literature on systemic risk indicators (e.g., Segoviano and Goodhart,
2009, Giesecke and Kim, 2011) or papers on early warning signals (e.g., Schwaab, Koop-
man, and Lucas, 2011, and Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section I, we briefly explain the
modelling idea and the data. Section II describes the model and estimation procedure for
individual companies’ VaRs, before presenting results on the financial network structure.
Section III discusses the second stage, the system VaR model, including estimation pro-
cedure, inference method and empirical results. In Section IV, we robustify and validate
our results by presenting a case study of five large financial institutions that were affected
by the financial crisis, and try to predict their distress and systemic relevance using only
pre-crisis data. Section V concludes.
I. A Framework for Measuring Systemic Relevance
A. Key Concepts
This section provides a compact overview of the major underlying concepts of how we
quantify systemic relevance of a company within the financial system network. It in-
troduces major underlying concepts, illustrates how the different steps of the empirical
analysis are linked to each other and thus outlines the remainder of the paper. Studying
the dependence between systemic risk and firm-specific risk requires modeling relations
in the (left) tails of respective asset return distributions, rather than in the center. This is
in sharp contrast to a correlation analysis detecting only dependence in mean returns and
being inable to quantify spillovers in situations of financial distress.
We consider a stress-test-type scenario for measuring how changes in individual company-
specific risk affect the risk of failure of the entire system given the underlying network
topology. Therefore, our model does not aim at being structural and building on a general
equilibrium framework, but is of reduced form allowing to capture the full partial effect
8
for a specific company as its systemic risk contribution. Relevant underlying network
linkages between tail risks of firms in the system are identified in a first step and crucially
determine each company’s tail risk drivers.
We measure systemic risk as the Value at Risk (VaR) of the system return Xs condi-
tional on externalities B.5 Then, systemic risk at time t is defined as the system’s loss
position occurring with probability p given externalities B, i.e.,
Pr(−Xst ≥ V aRsp,t) = Pr(Xst ≤ Qsp,t) = p . (1)
Accordingly, Qsp,t := Qp(X
s|B = Bt) = Qsp(Bt) corresponds to the conditional p-
quantile ofXs. The system VaR is defined using the convention that V aRsp,t = V aR
s
p(Bt) =
−Qsp,t, such that the VaR is non-negative and a higher VaR indicates higher risk as a func-
tion of B. The set B contains macroeconomic variables (as specified below), but also tail
risk measures of other financial companies. Obviously, due to strong interconnections,
the sum of individual tail risks may substantially differ from overall system tail risk. To
quantify the full partial effect of changes in the tail risk of an individual institution on the
tail risk of the financial system, we incorporate the tail risk of the specific company in
the vector of explanatory variablesB in (1) and quantify its marginal effect on the system
VaR.
In this context, we have to overcome several difficulties. First, the tail risk of a com-
pany i is not directly observable, but has to be estimated, e.g., by the company-specific
conditional Value-at-Risk V aRiq,t = V aR
i
q(Wt). For statistical inference, discussed later
in the paper, this makes a difference as we have to account for the fact that these vari-
ables are pre-estimated leading to nonstandard (increased) confidence intervals. We define
V aRiq(W) analogously to (1) as V aR
i
q,t = V aR
i
q(Wt) = −Qiq,t, where Qiq,t = Qiq(Wt)
is the conditional q-quantile of company i’s return X i conditional on characteristics W
observed in t. The setWt = (1,Mt−1,E−it ,C
i
t−1, X
i
t−1) contains the the possible tail risk
drivers of firm i consisting of macroeconomic state variables Mt−1, lagged firm-specific
characteristics Cit−1, its lagged return X it−1, and loss exceedances of other companies,
5The system return is defined as the value-weighted average return of a much larger number of compa-
nies than we include in our sample. For details, see Section B.
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E−it . The loss exceedance of a firm j is defined as E
j
t = X
j
t 1(X
j
t ≤ Qˆj0.1), where Qˆ0.1
is the 10% sample quantile of firm j’s return. Hence, by construction, company j only
affects company i if the former is under pressure which naturally captures dependencies
between tail risks of companies. Correspondingly, E−it = (E
j
t )j 6=i collects the loss ex-
ceedances of all firms apart from company i itself. While firm-specific variables, such as
leverage or maturity mismatch can be controlled by the bank itself and can thus be seen as
”internal” risk factors, macroeconomic state variables, such as credit spreads or liquidity
spreads, and spillovers from other firms under distress are exogenous risk drivers the bank
is exposed to.
DefineVt = (1,Mt−1,VaR−iq (Wt)) containing the macroeconomic state variables as
well as the VaR levels of all other companies but i in the system. Then, Bt is the vector
(Vt, V aR
i
q(Wt)) and the so-called systemic risk beta is the total marginal effect of firm
i’s tail risk on the system tail risk,
∂V aRsp(Vt, V aR
i
q(Wt))
∂V aRiq(Wt)
= βs|ip,q. (2)
The systemic risk beta can be itself time-varying as it is parameterized in terms of time-
varying firm-specific characteristics. This has been suppressed for ease of notation in (2).
Systemic risk betas and corresponding rankings comparing the systemic relevance of in-
dividual companies are analyzed in Section III.
The second and major difficulty is the question of which risk drivers out of the full sets
V and W are essential to be included in order to measure βs|ip,q unbiasedly while keeping
the model parsimonious and thus tractable. Indeed, not all companies are similarly and/or
significantly affected by all characteristics and all other firms contained in V and W.
Hence, selecting the statistically relevant risk drivers for each company i determines i-
specific characteristics V(i) and W(i) conditional on which the system VaR is linked to
V aRi. Thus it is sufficient if the reduced form model (2) for βs|ip,q only depends on V(i)
and W(i). Identifying the relevant V(i) and W(i), amounts to a model selection problem
for the tail risk of firm i which can be solved with an appropriate statistical penalization
technique. In particular, we provide a data-driven way to (pre-)select relevant variables
W(i) out ofW. Relevant companies appearing inW(i) are also those which could directly
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affect βs|ip,q in the equation (2) for the system VaR and should thus be contained inV(i). The
model selection step is not only necessary to keep the model parsimonious but also allows
to uncover underlying relevant tail risk dependencies between companies. Ignoring these
spillover effects would lead to a biased measure of systemic risk contribution. Moreover,
depicting all relevant risk connections between all firms in the system, results in a network
graph for systemic risk which contains valuable regulatory information on potential risk
channels and specific roles of companies as risk transmitters and/or recipients. Since the
identification of such network effects has to be performed before systemic risk betas can
be estimated, we present this analysis in Section II before we focus on the estimation of
systemic risk betas in Section III.
B. Data
Our analysis focuses on publicly traded U.S. financial institutions. The list of included
companies in Table I (see Appendix A) comprises depositories, broker dealers, insurance
companies and Others.6 We use publicly available market and balance sheet data for our
assessment of systemic relevance. This is a solid basis for transparent regulation since
timely access on detailed information of connections between firms’ assets and obliga-
tions, is very difficult and expensive to obtain – even for central banks. Daily equity prices
are obtained from Datastream and are converted to weekly log returns. To account for the
general state of the economy, we use weekly observations of lagged macroeconomic vari-
ables M t−1 as suggested and used by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010) (abbreviations as
used in the remainder of the paper are given in brackets):
(i) the implied volatility index, VIX, as computed by the Chicago Board Options Ex-
change (vix),
(ii) a short term ”liquidity spread”, computed as the difference of 3-month collateral
repo rate (available on Bloomberg) and the 3-month Treasury bill rate from the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (repo),
(iii) the change in the 3-month Treasury bill rate (yield3m),
6Companies are distinguished according to their two-digit SIC codes, following the categorization in
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010).
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(iv) the change in the slope of the yield curve, corresponding to the spread between the
10-year and 3-month Treasury bill rate (term),
(v) the change in the credit spread between BAA rated bonds and the Treasury bill rate
(both at 10 year maturity) (credit),
(vi) the weekly equity market return from CRSP (marketret),
(vii) the one-year cumulative real estate sector return, computed as the value-weighted
average of real estate companies available in the CRSP data base (housing).
Moreover, to capture characteristics of individual institutions predicting a bank’s propen-
sity to become financially distressed, Cit−1, we follow Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010)
and use
(i) leverage, calculated as the value of total assets divided by total equity (in book
values) (LEV),
(ii) maturity mismatch, measuring short-term refinancing risk, calculated as short term
debt net of cash divided by the total liabilities (MMM),
(iii) market-to-book value, defined as the ratio of the market value to the book value of
total equity (BM),
(iv) size, defined by the logarithm of market valued total assets (SIZE),
(v) equity return volatility, computed from daily equity return data (VOL).
Balance sheets are only available on a quarterly basis and are published on fixed dates
(December 31, March 31, June 30 and September 30), while calender weeks start dif-
ferently every year. As our analysis builds on weekly frequencies, we interpolate the
quarterly data to a daily level using cubic splines, and then aggregate them back to the
corresponding calendar weeks. As an illustration, Figure 4 shows the interpolated quar-
terly maturity mismatch times for Wells Fargo. We focus on 57 financial institutions for
which data is available during the period from beginning of 2000 to end of 2008, resulting
into 467 weekly observations on individual returns, macroeconomic factors and individ-
ual characteristics (after interpolation). The system return is chosen as the return on the
12
financial sector index provided by Datastream. It is computed as the value-weighted av-
erage of prices of 190 US financial institutions.
Focusing only on those companies for which a maximum of observations is avail-
able yields a higher precision of estimates, however, has the drawback that particularly
firms which defaulted during the financial crisis 2007-2009 are excluded from the anal-
ysis. Therefore, to validate and robustify our approach, we re-estimate the model over
a sub-period ending before the financial crisis and include the investment banks Lehman
Brothers and Merrill Lynch that were massively affected by the crisis. This ”case study”
provides an ex-ante assessment of companies which ex post have been identified as sys-
temically relevant and is given in Section IV.
II. A Systemic Risk Network
A. Network Model and Structure
We assume that the VaR of firm i follows a structural model based on those characteris-
tics W(i) which are relevant for company i. In particular, in a pre-step, these individual
tail risk drivers W(i) are selected out of lagged macroeconomic state variables, Mt−1, re-
turns of other distressed companies in the system, E−it , lagged firm-specific characteristics
Cit−1, the i-specific lagged return, X it−1, and an intercept. Depicting all connections be-
tween all firms and respective companies contained in their set of relevant tail risk drivers
produces the corresponding network graph of systemic risk.
A model for V aRi based on economic state variables as well as loss exceedances by
construction automatically adjusts and prevails even in distress scenarios under shocks
in externalities. This is a clear advantage compared to pure reduced form time series
approaches (cp. e.g. White, Kim, and Manganelli, 2010, and Brownlees and Engle, 2010).
For simplicity, we take the underlying model for each V aRiq as linear,
V aRiq = W
(i)′ξiq . (3)
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The coefficients in the model are specific to the considered quantile q underlying the VaR.
In the following, we describe how to statistically select W(i) for each firm i and pro-
vide an appropriate estimation technique for the coefficients ξip. Results for econometric
inference are non-standard as consistency and standard errors are affected by the pre-
selection step and significance tests in quantile relations require backtesting techniques.
We summarize the main results in the text, but provide more technical details in the ap-
pendix.
B. Identification of Tail Risk Drivers and Estimation
For each firm i in the system, we jointly observe (X it ,Wt) at all time points t = 1, . . . , T ,
in the sample with theK-vector of all possible risk drivers Wt = (1,Mt−1,X−it ,C
i
t−1, X
i
t−1).
According to (1), the firm-specific conditional V aRiq,t at level q and time point t is de-
fined as the negative conditional q-quantile of X i given W(i)t . Thus, at a specific time
point t ∈ [0, T ], the structural linear model (3) for the VaR corresponds in the quantile to
X it = −W(i)t
′
ξiq + ε
i
t, for Qq(ε
i
t|W(i)t ) = 0. (4)
If we knew the i-relevant risk drivers W(i) selected out of W, then, estimates ξ̂iq of ξ
i
q
could be obtained according to standard linear quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett,
1978) by minimizing
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρq
(
X it + W
(i)
t
′
ξiq
)
(5)
with loss function ρq(u) = u(q − I(u < 0)), where the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and
zero otherwise, and
V̂ aR
i
q,t = W
(i)
t
′
ξ̂
i
q . (6)
However, the relevant risk drivers W(i) for firm i are unknown and must be determined
from W in advance. Model selection is not straightforward in the given setting as tests
on the individual significance of single variables do not account for the (possibly high)
collinearity between the covariates. Moreover, sequences of joint significance test have
too many possible variations to be easily checked in case of more than 60 variables. Since
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alternative model selection techniques, like BIC or AIC, are not available in a quantile
setting, we choose the relevant covariates in a data-driven way by employing a statis-
tical shrinkage technique known as the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator
(LASSO). LASSO methods are standard for high-dimensional conditional mean regres-
sion problems (see Tibshirani, 1996), and recently have been adapted to quantile regres-
sion by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Accordingly, we run an L1-penalized quantile
regression and calculate for a fixed individual penalty parameter λi ∈ [0, 1],
ξ˜
i
q = argminξi
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρq
(
X it + W
′
tξ
i
)
+ λi
√
q(1− q)
T
K∑
k=1
σˆk|ξik| , (7)
with Wt = (Wt,k)Kk=1, σˆk =
1
T
∑T
t=1(Wt,k)
2 and the loss function ρq given by (5) (see
Belloni and Chernozhukov, 2011). The underlying principle is to select relevant regres-
sors according to the magnitude of their respective coefficients (scaled by the regressor’s
variation). Regressors are then eliminated if their shrunken coefficients are at (or close to)
zero. Here, we eliminate all firms in W with marginal effects |ξ˜i| being in absolute terms
below a threshold τ = 0.0001 and keep only the K(i) relevant regressors W(i). Hence,
LASSO de-selects those regressors contributing only little variation. As all coefficients
ξ˜
i
q are generally downward biased in finite samples because of the additional penalty term
in 7, we then re-estimate the unrestricted model (5) with W(i) to obtain final estimates ξ̂iq.
This post-LASSO step produces superior finite sample estimates of coefficients ξiq. For
more details, see the Appendix.
The selection of relevant risk drivers via LASSO crucially depends on the choice of the
company-specific penalty parameter λi. The larger λi, the more regressors are eliminated.
Conversely, in case of λi = 0, we are back in the standard quantile regression setting (5)
without any de-selection. Accounting for possible serial dependencies in risk drivers Wt,
we determine λi in a data-driven way following a bootstrap type procedure as suggested
by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011):
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Step 1 Take T iid draws from U [0, 1] independent of W1, . . . ,WT denoted asU1, . . . , UT .
Conditional on observations of W, calculate the corresponding value of the random
variable,
Λi = T max
1≤k≤K
1
T
T∑
t=1
Wt,k(q − I(Ut ≤ q))
σˆk
√
q(1− q) .
Step 2 Repeat step 1 for B=500 times generating the empirical distribution of Λi condi-
tional on W through Λi1, . . . ,ΛiB. For a confidence level α ≤ 1/K in the selection,
set
λi = c ·Q(Λi, 1− α|Wt),
where Q(Λi, 1− α|Wt) denotes the (1− α)-quantile of Λi given Wt and c ≤ 2 is a
constant.
The choice of α is a trade-off between a high confidence level and a corresponding high
regularization bias from high penalty levels in (7). As in the simulation results in Belloni
and Chernozhukov (2011), we choose α = 0.1, which suffices to get optimal rates of
the post-penalization estimators below. Finally, the parameter c is selected in a data-
dependent way such that the fit of V aRi is optimized. The latter is evaluated in terms of
its best backtesting performance according to the procedure described below.
C. Model Validation by Backtesting
We evaluate the adequacy of the VaR estimates by quantifying their in-sample predictive
ability. This procedure is an alternative to (infeasible) sequential testing procedures on
the joint significance of explanatory variables and, moreover, yields a data-driven way to
select c in the LASSO algorithm. In particular, we consider a VaR model as being inade-
quate if it fails to produce a sequence of independent VaR exceedances over the considered
time period. This is formally tested using a likelihood ratio version of the dynamic quan-
tile (DQ) test developed in Engle and Manganelli (2004). Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and
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Pelletier (2009) show that the resulting likelihood ratio test has superior size and power
properties compared to competing VaR backtesting methods.
For each institution i, we measure VaR exceedances as I it ≡ I(X it < −V aRiq,t). If the
chosen model is correct, then,
E[I it |Ωt] = q , (8)
where Ωt is the information set up to t. The VaR is estimated correctly, if independently
for each day of the covered period, the probability of exceeding the VaR equals q. Similar
to Engle and Manganelli (2004), Kuester, Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) and Taylor (2008),
we include a constant, three lagged values of It and the current VaR estimate in the in-
formation set Ωt. Then, condition (8) can be checked by estimating a logistic regression
model
I it = α + A
′
tθ + Ut,
with covariates At = (I it−1, I
i
t−2, I
i
t−3, V̂ aR
i
t−1)
′. Denote by I¯ i the sample mean of the
binary response I it and define Flog(·) as the cumulative distribution function of the logistic
distribution. Then, under the joint hypothesis
H0 : α = q and θ1 = · · ·θ4 = 0,
we find the asymptotic distribution of the corresponding likelihood ratio test statistic as
LR = −2(lnLr − lnLu) a∼ χ25 . (9)
Here, lnLu =
∑n
t=1 [I
i
tFlog(α + A
′
tθ) + (1− I it) ln (1− Flog(α + A′tθ))] is the unre-
stricted log likelihood function which under H0 simplifies to lnLr = nI¯ i ln(q) + n(1 −
I¯ i) ln(1− q).
The company-specific outcomes of this test are used to choose the parameter c in the
LASSO procedure in a data-driven way. In particular, c is chosen such that the p-value
associated with (9) for the correspondingly selected model is maximized. This automati-
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cally ensures that the LASSO-selected risk drivers for each firm yield optimal in-sample
predictions of idiosyncratic tail risk. 7
D. Idiosyncratic Risks and Systemic Risk Networks: Empirical Find-
ings
D.1. Idiosyncratic Tail Risks
Table II reports the outcomes of the back-testing procedure for the LASSO-selected indi-
vidual VaR specifications of all 57 financial companies in our sample. We choose q=0.05,
i.e., focus on the 95%-quantile of the loss distribution.8 All selected models provide good
in-sample fits with most p-values being well above 0.5. Also the coverages are very close
to the nominal level of 5% indicating that the estimated V̂ aR
i
series capture company-
specific tail risks very well.
For the sake of brevity, we do not report all individual VaR regressions but show ex-
emplary V aRi (post-)LASSO regressions for companies representing the four branches
of depositories, insurances, brokers and others in Tables III and IV. It turns out that the
LASSO-selected risk drivers significantly differ across companies. Not surprisingly, this
is particularly true for the individually selected loss exceedances of other companies com-
prising the risk network discussed below. For example, the selected drivers determining
the VaR of Goldman Sachs (GS) include, on the one hand, loss exceedances of its biggest
competitor, Morgan Stanley (MS) and the insurance company American International
Group (AIG). Likewise, Morgan Stanley is driven by the tail risk of many other big com-
panies. Conversely, AIG is influenced by only a few other companies including, however,
among others, the mortgage company Freddie Mac (FRE). This risk spillover is highly
plausible given the evidence from the financial crisis 2008 and is discussed in more detail
7In rare cases, however, the resulting selected model is too small, in the sense that only macroeconomic
variables are included. Then, the system VaR regression cannot be performed, because both the individual
VaR and the system VaR are linear combinations of the same variables inducing perfect multi-collinearity.
In such cases, we decrease the factor c until the most relevant (additional) risk driver is included and the
resulting regressor matrix becomes non-singular. In their empirical example, Belloni and Chernozhukov
(2011) apply a similar adjustment procedure.
8Due to the limited number of observations, we refrain from considering more extreme probabilities.
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below. Note that nearly all loss exceedances have the expected signs: The greater the
loss of other companies (i.e., the more negative their returns falling below the 10% quan-
tile), the higher the VaR and thus the potential loss of the firm under consideration. The
company-specific accounting variables as well as the macroeconomic state variables enter
the regressions mostly with positive coefficients. Particularly, leverage, implied market
volatility (represented by the VIX) as well as real estate sector returns positively affect
companies’ tail risk. The latter reflect firm’s sensitivity to rising housing prices which
was one of the major causes for the financial crisis in 2008.
Summary statistics of the estimated VaR time series are given in Table V. We observe
a substantial variation of VaRs over the cross-section of the sample as well as over time.
The reported quantiles of the VaR realizations indicate that company-specific tail risks,
i.e., the magnitude of potential losses, strongly vary over time. In fact, for nearly all
companies the highest VaRs and thus the highest realizations of idiosyncratic risk are
observed during the financial crisis in 2008.
D.2. The Systemic Risk Network
The individually selected loss exceedances of other companies as tail risk drivers for each
firm determine the underlying network of risk spillovers. An overview of the identified
tail risk connections between all companies is provided in Table VI. We observe that the
number of risk connections substantially vary over the cross-section of companies. While
some firms such as, e.g., Morgan Stanley, American Express as well as Bank of New
York Mellon, are strongly inter-connected and receive substantial tail risk from other
companies, there are institutions for which no network effects can be identified at all.
These firms are apparently not significantly influenced, but can themselves still act as risk
drivers for others.
In order to effectively summarize and to depict the identified risk connections and
directions, we graphically present the entire network of companies in Figure 5. Taking all
firms as nodes in such a network, there is an influence of firm j on firm i, if Ej is selected
as a relevant risk externality of firm i in V aRiq. In particular, if E
j is part of W(i) as its
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k-th component, then the corresponding coefficient ξiq,k in ξ
i
q delivers the thickness of the
arrow from firm j to firm i in the network graph. If Ej is not selected as relevant risk
driver of firm i, there is no arrow from firm j to firm i. Building the network of relevant
spillover effects in such a way does not require the relations between companies to be
symmetric. This very much corresponds to empirical evidence, as, e.g., Bank of America
might strongly influence a small depository, but vice versa there is no direct significant
effect. Moreover, note that dependencies between (extreme) quantiles reflect spillovers in
possible losses (occurring with probability q) but not necessarily in actually realized ones.
We identify four major groups of firms: The first category contains companies with
only very few incoming arrows but numerous outgoing ones. These are companies whose
potential failure might affect many others but, conversely, which are themselves relatively
unaffected by the distress of other firms. We associate these relations with rather ”one-
sided” network dependencies. Companies belonging to this group are originators of risk
spillovers. Hence, their failure can induce substantial risks of failure of the entire sys-
tem. Therefore, these firms should be particularly monitored by regulatory authorities.
These are, e.g., Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Freddie Mac (FRE), Charles
Schwab Corporation (SCHW), MBIA (MBI), Unum Group (UNM) and Hartford Finan-
cials (HIG). Bank of America and Citigroup are among the top five largest banks in the
U.S. Financial distress of these banks obviously has wide-spread consequences. On the
other hand, these banks are sufficiently large and own-standing not to be severely affected
by the distress of others. Freddie Mac, one of the two largest U.S. mortgage companies,
reveals spillovers particularly to large insurance companies such as AIG and MBIA who
hold significant positions in mortgage backed securities. These relationships have been
one of the major reasons for the financial crisis 2008. Charles Schwab (SCHW) is one of
the largest discount brokers having risk connections to JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley,
among others. MBIA, Unum Group and Hartford Financials are large insurance com-
panies. Due to investments in mortgage backed securities, MBIA realized severe losses
during the financial crisis. Our network graph reveals a corresponding dependence on
Freddie Mac and shows that MBIA itself affects many other firms.
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The second group consists of companies which are strongly interconnected with many
other firms. These are Morgan Stanley (MS) and JP Morgan (JPM), belonging to the
largest banks in the U.S., Fannie Mae (FNM), the main competitor of Freddie Mac, Amer-
ican Express (AXP), one of the biggest financial service companies, as well as the insur-
ance company Lincoln Financial Corporation (LNC). These firms are strongly imbedded
in the system and thus are both producers and recipients of tail risk. In several cases, these
companies amplify tail risk spillovers by further disseminating risk into new channels. A
prominent example is Morgan Stanley which is placed in the center of the network and
transports risk in many directions. In particular, Morgan Stanley disseminates spillovers
from Bank of America which makes the latter itself deeply interconnected. Due to their
role as risk distributors such companies are systemically risky and should be supervised
on a regular basis.
The third group contains companies which do not serve as major risk producers but
are themselves potentially affected by many other institutions. An interesting example is
the Bank of New York Mellon (BK) revealing substantial risk input. This is illustrated
in Figure 3 depicting the specific role of Bank of New York in the systemic risk net-
work. The bank receives risk spillover from many other institutions including several
large depositories and broker dealers. This is due to the fact that it serves as one of the
major clearing banks in the U.S. Accordingly, its risk increases as soon as its large corpo-
rate customers become financially distressed. Further examples are Allstate Corporation
(ALL), the second-largest personal lines insurer in the U.S., and Cincinnati Financial Cor-
poration (CINF), a company for property and causalty insurance. Finally, we identify a
group of companies revealing strong risk connections with only very few other firms. Ex-
amples of these predominantly bilateral dependencies are connections between Morgan
Stanley and Citigroup, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as well as between Goldman Sachs
and JP Morgan.
Distinguishing between these four industry groups, we observe that depositories tend
to be less involved than insurance companies. Most insurances are placed in the center
of the network graph and thus serve as both risk recipients and transmitters. The same
is true for broker dealers which tend to be even stronger interconnected. As discussed
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Figure 3: Schematic subgraph of the risk network of the U.S. financial system highlighting the
role of the Bank of New York Mellon (BK) in bold as a major clearing house. For simplicity, ar-
rows only mark risk spillovers effects without referring to their respective size, otherwise they are
as defined in Figure 1. Likewise, the colors are defined as in Figure 1. Arrows are only displayed
in this figure if pointing towards BK. The graph only contains firms with a direct influence on BK
(in the shaded ellipsoid closest to BK) and those which might influence BK on a "second level"
(in the larger ellipsoid). A list of their abbreviations is contained in Table I.
above, an extreme example is Morgan Stanley which is heavily involved and imports as
well as exports tail risk in many directions. In contrast, several depositories are placed
at the edge of the network and tend to serve rather as risk transmitters than recipients.
Typical examples are Bank of America and Citigroup which are, however, themselves
strongly connected to risk distributors which further disseminate tail risk.
Figure 6 shows a subset of the network depicting only the risk linkages of Citigroup.
The number of possibly affected banks might be used as an indicator of Citigroup’s sys-
temic relevance. Holding fixed Citigroup’s tail risk inflow (from LNC and JPM), this
”network tree” graphically presents how financial distress is transmitted through the sys-
tem. Figure 7 presents the corresponding network tree for Morgan Stanley. As discussed
above, this company shows bi-directional risk connections with numerous other compa-
nies. Therefore, in this case, causal interpretations are harder and require to condition on
the risk in-flows of several other firms. However, the topology of this sub-network looks
quite different than that of Citigroup. The latter has only a few direct connections with
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other firms which are, however, further distributed in many other directions in the next
layers. Conversely, Morgan Stanley has more neighbors which are directly affected by
risk spillovers which are still further multiplied in the second level.
Hence, though a risk network does not allow to quantitatively assess the systemic rel-
evance of a financial institution, the degree of firms’ interconnectedness and the specific
topology of the network or corresponding sub-networks allows to identify possible risk
channels in the system. These interlinkages are central for macroprudential regulation.
They reflect the particular role of a firm as risk recipient, transmitter or distributor of tail
risk. In this sense, systemic risk networks provide valuable accompanying information
for a reduced-form analysis quantifying the marginal effects of individual distress on the
system. Such an analysis is performed in the following section.
III. Quantifying Systemic Risk Contributions
A. A Reduced Form Model for Systemic Risk Betas
Our main focus is to provide an accurate but parsimonious measure of the effect of a
marginal change in the tail risk of firm i on the tail risk of the system given the underlying
network structure of the financial system. For an unbiased marginal effect, however, it is
sufficient just to control for all firm i-specific risk drivers in a corresponding reduced-form
model. Conversely, a fully-fledged structural general equilibrium model is not necessary
and, even if correctly specified, would be almost impossible to estimate, given the high-
dimensionality and interconnectedness of the financial system on the one hand and data
availability on the other. Moreover, variables unrelated to V aRi do not affect firm i’s
systemic risk contribution.9 For this reason, we propose estimating systemic risk con-
tributions based on reduced-form models which are specific for each firm i as they only
9See Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Val (2006) for a simple Frisch-Waugh-type argument in
quantile regressions.
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control for the i-specific risk drivers. Correspondingly, we estimate the firm-i-specific
systemic risk beta βs|iq,p based on a linear model for the system VaR of the form
V aRsp,t = V
(i)
t
′
γsp + β
s|i
p,qV aR
i
q,t, (10)
where the vector of regressors V(i)t = (1,Mt−1,VaR
(−i)
q,t ) includes a constant effect,
lagged macroeconomic state variables and the VaRs of all companies which are identi-
fied as risk drivers for firm i via LASSO in Section II.
The systemic risk beta βs|ip,q = βs|i of company i captures the effect of a marginal
change in V aRit on V aR
s
t . It can be interpreted in analogy to an inverse asset pricing
relationship in quantiles, where bank i’s return quantiles drive the quantiles of the sys-
tem given network-specific effects and firm-specific and macroeconomic state variables.
Accordingly,
β¯s|ip,q := β
s|i
p,qV aR
i
t (11)
measures the full partial effect of a tail risk increase of bank i on V aRst . We refer to β¯
s|i
p,q
as standardized systemic risk beta since it allows to cross-sectionally compare systemic
risk contributions and to rank banks according to their systemic relevance.
During periods of turbulence, such as crises, not only banks’ risk exposures change
but also their marginal importance for the system might vary. We therefore allow βs|i
being time-varying. In particular, time-variation occurs through observable factors Zi
characterizing a bank’s propensity to get in financial distress. Accordingly, βs|it should
be interpreted as a conditional systemic risk beta. Basing βs|i on lagged characteristics,
makes betas and thus corresponding systemic risk rankings predictable which is important
for forward-looking regulation. To limit complexity and computational burden of the
model, we assume linearity of βs|ip,q,t in KZ firm-specific distress indicators Z
i
t−1,
β
s|i
p,q,t = β
s|i
0,p,q + Z
i
t−1
′
ηs|ip,q, (12)
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where ηs|ip,q are the parameters driving the time-varying effects. The case of a constant
systemic risk beta is obviously contained as a special case if ηs|ip,q = 0 and thus β
s|i
0,p,q =
β
s|i
p,q,t = β
s|i
p,q.
We suggest choosing Zit as a subset of C
i
t consisting of the major drivers of a bank’s
distress such as size, leverage, and maturity mismatch. As a testable hypothesis, we pos-
tulate that these variables do not only affect a bank’s VaR, but simultaneously also drive
its marginal systemic relevance. As a consequence, rankings based on βs|it directly control
for size, leverage, and maturity mismatch and do not require any ex-post adjustments for
these characteristics. Due to the linearity of (12) we can thus write the quantile model (10)
for V aRsp with time-varying β
s|i
p,q,t in the following form
V aRsp,t = V
(i)
t
′
γsp + β
s|i
0,p,qV aR
i
q,t + (V aR
i
q,t · Zit−1)′ηs|ip,q . (13)
B. Estimation and Inference
If firm specific VaRs were directly observable, the magnitude and significance of i-specific
systemic risk betas could be directly inferred from the linear quantile regression (13) with
the VaR defined by (1). However, note that the regressors V aRit and VaR
(−i)
q,t in V
(i) are
pre-estimated as they arise from the first-step quantile regressions as shown in Section II.
Hence, operationalizing (13) with V̂ aR
i
t and V̂aR
(−i)
q,t as generated regressors, yields the
(second step) quantile regression,
Xst = −V̂(i)
′
tγ
s
p − βs|i0,p,qV̂ aR
i
q,t − (V̂ aR
i
q,t · Zit−1)
′
ηs|ip,q + ε
s
t , (14)
with Qp(εst |V̂ aR
i
q,t, V̂t,Z
i
t−1) = 0 .
With the notation V̂t, we stress that some components of V are pre-estimated as V̂aR
(−i)
q,t .
Then, analogously to the first-step regressions in Section II, parameter estimates are ob-
tained via quantile regression minimizing
1
T
T∑
t=1
ρp
(
Xst + V̂
(i)
′
tγ
s
p + β
s|i
0,p,qV̂ aR
i
q,t + (V̂ aR
i
q,t · Zit−1)
′
ηs|ip,q
)
(15)
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in the unknown parameters. Consequently, the resulting estimate of the full time-varying
marginal effect β̂s|ip,q in (12) is obtained as
β̂
s|i
p,q,t = β̂
s|i
0,p,q + Z
i
t−1
′
η̂p,q
s|i (16)
for given values Zit−1.
Since V aRiq,t is a function of W
(i), conditional quantile independence in (14) is equiv-
alent to Qp(εst |W(i)t ,W(−i)t ,Zit−1) = 0 where W(−i)t stacks W(j)t for all firms relevant for
company i appearing in V̂aR
(−i)
q,t . Hence, with both quantile regression steps being linear,
inserting (3) into (13) yields a full model for the system’s tail risk in observable character-
istics. However, direct one-step estimation is only feasible if the choice of W (i) and thus
VaR(−i)q,t is still determined in a pre-step from individual VaR regressions. Model selec-
tion based on the full model of V aRs in observables is infeasible since correlation effects
among the huge number of regressors would produce unreliable results. Furthermore, in-
dividual parameters βs|i0,p,q and η
s|i
p,q could not be identified without additional identification
condition Qq(εit|W(i)t ) = 0, implicitly bringing back the first-step estimation. Therefore
we use two-step estimation even if exact asymptotic confidence intervals are larger than
for an (infeasible) single step procedure. In contrast to mean regressions, such results are
non-standard in a quantile setting and are therefore provided in detail in the Appendix.
In finite samples, however, asymptotic distributions often only provide a poor approxi-
mation to the true distribution of the (scaled) difference between the estimator and the
true value if sample sizes are not sufficiently large. In case of quantile regressions, this
effect is even more pronounced, since valid estimates for the asymptotic variance follow
poor non-parametric rates and thus require even larger sample sizes to obtain the same
precision.
Therefore, for judging the quality of the estimates βˆs|ip,q,t, we suggest a procedure for
testing their significance which is valid in finite samples. In the given setting, we aim
at testing for the significance of a systemic risk beta, and/or time-variations thereof. We
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adapt a test proposed by Chen, Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) for median regressions to a
quantile setting. The test statistic is
ST = min
ξs∈Ω0
T∑
t=1
ρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)− min
ξs∈RdB
T∑
t=1
ρp(X
s
t − B′tξs), (17)
with the compound vector of all regressors in V aRs, Bt ≡ (V aRit, V aRit · Zit−1,V(i)t ),
corresponding parameter dB-vector ξs, and Ω0 refering to the constrained set of parame-
ters underH0. The asymptotic distribution of ST involves the probability density function
of the underlying error terms and is not feasible. Furthermore, bootstrapping ST directly
would yield inconsistent results. Therefore, we re-sample from the adjusted statistic
S∗T = min
ξs∈Ω0
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)− min
ξs∈RdB
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξs)
−
(
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξˆ
s
c)−
T∑
t=1
wtρp(X
s
t − B′tξˆ
s
)
)
, (18)
where ξˆ
s
c denotes the constrained estimate of ξ
s, and {wt} is a sequence of standard ex-
ponentially distributed random variables, having both mean and variance equal to one.
According to Chen, Ying, Zhang, and Zhao (2008), the empirical distribution of S∗T pro-
vides a good approximation of the distribution of ST . Thus, if the test statistic ST exceeds
some large quantile of the re-sampling distribution of S∗T , the null hypothesis is rejected.
The proposed testing method does not require re-sampling of observations but is en-
tirely based on the original sample. This provides significant gains in accuracy in the
two-step regression setting as opposed to standard pairwise bootstrap techniques as a fur-
ther alternative. A pre-analysis shows that this wild bootstrap type procedure is valid in
the presented form as any serial dependence in the data is sufficiently captured by the
regressors in the reduced-form relation not requiring block-bootstrap techniques.10
10Pairwise block-bootstrap yields block lengths of one according to the standard procedure of Lahiri
(2001). Results are available upon request.
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C. Empirical Evidence on Systemic Risk Betas
We estimate systemic risk betas according to (14) with their time variation driven by Zi
consisting of a firm’s leverage, maturity mismatch and size. Hence, time-variations of sys-
temic risk betas are exclusively due to changes of firm-specific effects. As a consequence,
systemic risk contributions of two companies with the same exposure to macroeconomic
risk factors and financial network spillovers may be still different as they depend on their
balance sheet structures. As in the first-step estimations we choose q = 0.05, i.e., we
model the loss which will not be exceeded with 95% probability. For notational conve-
nience, we supress the quantile index as we set p = q.
Table VII reports the point estimates for βs|i0 , the constant (marginal) effect of V aR
i on
V aRs as well as the parameters associated with the interaction variables, ηs|iMMM , η
s|i
SIZE
and ηs|iLEV . Note that a positive systemic risk beta indicates that an increase in V̂ aR
i
(expressed as a positive number) induces an increase of the conditional quantile of the
negative system return distribution and thus rises the risk of distress of the system.
In order to test whether a company’s systemic relevance is statistically significant, we
test its systemic risk beta against zero, i.e., βs|it = 0. This test requires testing for the joint
significance of all variables driving a firm’s marginal impact leading to the hypothesis
H1 : βs|i0 = η
s|i
MMM = η
s|i
SIZE = η
s|i
LEV = 0.
If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, an increase of the company’s possible loss posi-
tion, given all economic state variables and i-specific risk inflows from other companies,
does not induce a significantly higher potential systemic loss. Accordingly, we consider
such a company as not being systemically relevant. To test whether systemic risk betas
are time-varying, we test the joint hypothesis
H2 : ηs|iMMM = η
s|i
SIZE = η
s|i
LEV = 0.
If this hypothesis is not rejected, we re-specify the systemic risk beta as being constant
and re-estimate the model without interaction variables. In this case, βs|it = βs|i.
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The underlying tests are performed using the wild bootstrap procedure illustrated in
Section B based on 2, 000 resamples of the test statistic. The results are reported in form
of p-values in Table VII. According to our test outcomes we distinguish between three
groups of companies. In the upper part of the table, we report the estimates of sys-
temically relevant companies with time-varying systemic risk betas (i.e., rejecting both
hypotheses H1 and H2), while in the middle panel, we show results for firms that are
systemically relevant but reveal time-invariant betas (i.e., rejecting H1 but not H2). Fi-
nally, the lower panel contains institutions that are not significantly systemically relevant.
The underlying significance level is chosen to be 10% as the number of observations is
not very large relative to the number of regressors, in particular, when considering the
two-stage regression setting.
As shown by Table VII, various companies are systemically not relevant as their marginal
contributions to the system’s tail risk are not significant. Confirming the network anal-
ysis in Section D.2, most of these companies do not serve as tail risk drivers for other
firms. Notable exceptions are the two government-sponsored companies (GSEs) Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor-
poration (Freddie Mac). The latter were massively affected by the financial crisis and
were bailed out by Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury in July 2008. The fact that these
companies are not significantly systemically relevant through the entire sample period is
obviously due to a structural change in September 2008, when the two GSEs were placed
under conservatorship of the U.S. government. To provide deeper insights into such ef-
fects, we re-visit the systemic importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, among others,
by explicitly focusing on a period before the crisis in Section IV. Moreover, more than
half of all insurance companies are shown to be systemically not relevant. As pointed
out by Schich (2009), many of these companies were also not too much affected during
the financial crisis 2007-2009 as their investment portfolios mainly contained stocks and
bonds rather than mortgage-backed securities.
Overall, the majority of systemically relevant companies are banks. Among the (sig-
nificantly) systemically relevant firms, several companies reveal systemic risk betas for
which we cannot identify significant time variations in dependence of company-specific
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characteristics. Hence, those companies’ marginal contributions to systemic risk are obvi-
ously not affected by their size, leverage, and maturity mismatch. Examples are Regions
Financial, Zions Corporation and JP Morgan with comparably high systemic risk betas
across time and the cross-section of institutions. In contrast, for many other firms, we
indeed find significant time-varying marginal effects on systemic risk. As reported by
Table VII, the coefficients associated with maturity mismatch, size and leverage driving
the time variation in systemic risk betas are dominantly positive. Thus marginal systemic
relevance increases if a company becomes larger and is exposed to higher idiosyncratic
risk.11
Important examples of companies with highly significant and time-varying systemic
risk betas are Bank of America and AIG. AIG was among the largest issuers and holders
of credit default swaps (CDS) and other credit securitization derivatives before the crisis.
Its obviously strong exposure to mortgage default risks is reflected by a strong dependence
to Freddie Mac as reflected in the network graph in Figure 5. Consequently, AIG faced
tremendous write-downs in 2008, and received rescue packages amounting to USD 150
billion (see Schich, 2009). Our finding of AIG being systemically relevant quantitatively
complements our results on AIG’s network dependencies (see Section D.2) revealing how
AIG’s tail risk affects the financial system. In fact, AIG produces risk spill-overs to Gold-
man Sachs and Morgan Stanley, among others. As discussed above, particularly Morgan
Stanley is deeply interconnected and serves as multiplier of tail risk. Its strong link to
AIG is obviously a major channel for the formation of systemic risk. The upper part
of Figure 8 depicts the AIG-specific estimates of βs|it and V aRit as well as the product
thereof, β¯s|it , measuring the standardized systemic risk contribution. We observe that sys-
temic risk betas significantly vary over time and particularly increase during the financial
crisis. Likewise, the firm’s VaR strongly increases during the crisis period reflecting also
severe idiosyncratic risk. Naturally the same pattern is revealed by the standardized sys-
temic risk beta β¯s|it . Though on first sight, it seems to be counter-intuitive that towards
the end of the sample, both βˆs|it and
̂¯βs|it decrease, this pattern is explained by the fact that
11However, because of multi-collinearity between these variables, the interpretation of individual coeffi-
cients is rather difficult. Therefore, it is more reasonable to analyze their total impact on systemic risk betas
resulting in variations over time. This analysis is performed in Section D.
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the rescue packages from the Federal Reserve were issued in September 2008. This step
signficantly reduced the risk of both AIG’s and the entire system’s failure.
Another example is Bank of America. As discussed in Section D.2, Bank of America
serves as a tail risk driver for others but is not a tail risk recipient. Our estimates indicate
that its risk channels, particularly to Morgan Stanley, are systemically critical. Figure
8 shows that Bank of America’s systemic risk beta has been relatively stable before the
financial crisis but significantly dropped after the issuance of the Federal Reserve’s rescue
packages. Nevertheless, its VaR and thus its standardized systemic risk beta strongly
increased during the crisis and particularly thereafter. The average standardized systemic
risk beta computed over the entire sample period indicates that a 1% increase of the VaR
induces a 8.7 basis point increase of the system VaR.
To cross-validate our findings with external evaluations of banks’ systemic importance
we refer to the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) conducted by the Fed-
eral Reserve in spring 2009. The 19 largest bank holding companies went through com-
prehensive investigations resulting in estimates of a potential lack of capital buffer to
cover their risks under an adverse macro scenario. In this analysis, detailed information
on balance sheet positions were used, including data which are not publicly available. For
details, see Federal Reserve System (2009). Since the SCAP took place right after the
end of our sample period, it is insightful to compare the outcomes with our results and
to check whether our model, which uses more aggregated data, is still able to detect the
systemic riskiness of those companies that, according to the SCAP, faced capital short-
age in the stress test scenario. Indeed, the financial institution with the biggest potential
lack of capital buffer according to the SCAP, Bank of America, is among our systemi-
cally relevant companies, with a highly significant systemic risk beta βs|it . In addition,
with Citigroup, FifthThird Bancorp, Morgan Stanley, PNC, Regions Financial, SunTrust
Banks and Wells Fargo we identify all eight banks contained in our database12 which,
according to the SCAP results, were threatened by financial distress under more adverse
market conditions. This becomes even more evident in light of the systemic risk rankings
as shown in Section D.
12Due to a lack of data, we cannot include KeyCorp and GMAC in our analysis which also have been
found to be financially distressed in a critical macroeconomic environment.
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In summary, we find that the estimates of systemic risk betas seem to reflect compa-
nies’ systemic riskiness very well. Our results are strongly in line with the actual situa-
tions the included financial institutions were facing during the sample period. Moreover,
our findings confirm the empirical evidence and developments observed during the finan-
cial crisis in 2008. For a further robustification of our results, we separately study only
the pre-crisis period in Section IV.
D. Rankings of Systemic Risk Contributions
Systemic risk contributions of firms measured by respective systemic risk betas (11)
might be time-varying. Their standardized form can be used to obtain rankings of com-
panies’ systemic relevance at any point in time.
We use the outcome of the statistical tests from the previous subsection to decide
whether a systemic risk beta should be treated as being time-varying or time-invariant.
In particular, we keep the most general time-varying model whenever time-invariance
of systemic risk betas can be rejected at the 10%-level. In this case, the standardized
systemic risk beta β¯s|it varies over time through two channels: a time-varying beta, β
s|i
t
and a time-varying Value-at-Risk, V aRit. Conversely, for companies with constant sys-
temic risk betas (middle panel of Table VII), the observed time variation in standardized
systemic risk beta (11) originates only from time variations in V aRi. In this case, we
re-estimate the model with constant systemic risk betas with the corresponding estima-
tion results given in Table VIII. As an additional backtest, we also provide results for the
significance of such constant betas, i.e., we test the hypothesis
H3 : βs|i = 0.
In all but one case, H3 is rejected on a 10% significance level.13 Moreover, note that
conclusions on a company’s systemic relevance are only sensible if the systemic risk
impact βs|i is positive, implying that an increase in V aRi also increases the system VaR.
13The only exception is the insurance company Torchmark, where the p-value is 0.36. Consequently, we
ultimately exclude it from the category of systemically relevant companies.
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As reported by Tables VII and VIII, this is not the case for very few companies which we
exclude from the ranking analysis. Consequently, not all companies necessarily appear in
all rankings in Tables IX to XI.
To provide an overview, Table IX gives a ranking based on averaged standardized sys-
temic risk betas over the period from 2000 to 2008. Accordingly, Bank of America is
identified as being systemically most risky with a (standardized) systemic risk beta being
more than double than that of the next largest ones. However, note that average systemic
risk betas only provide an incomplete picture as they aggregate companies’ marginal sys-
temic risk contributions and VaRs over time ignoring potential changes in the structure
of the financial sector. Accordingly, apart from Bank of America, most companies reveal
relatively similar average risk contributions over the considered period. Therefore, in this
context, differences in ranks between companies should not be overinterpreted.
In contrast, monitoring the evolution of systemic risk betas over time provides a more
informative picture on companies’ specific systemic importance and yields valuable feed-
back from the market for forward-looking regulation. To illustrate the potential of our
approach, we show the rankings at two specific time points: Table X gives the systemic
risk ranking for the last week in May 2007, which was a relatively ”calm” time before the
start of the financial crisis. Table XI, on the other hand, shows the ranking at the end of
September 2008, shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Comparing the pre-crisis
and post-crisis rankings, we observe clear changes. Overall, systemic risk betas – and
thus the magnitude of systemic risk contributions – have sharply increased. The strongest
effects are identified for Fifth Third Bancorporation showing the lowest standardized sys-
temic risk beta in 2007 (among the group of systemically relevant firms) and belonging
to the most risky companies in 2008. This evolution is reflected by a 50-fold increase
of the standardized systemic risk beta. Likewise, we observe a 12-fold increase for AIG,
a 10-fold increase for Regions Financial, a 7-fold increase for Wells Fargo and a 6-fold
increase for E Trade Financial Corporation.
We observe that the increases of standardized systemic risk betas are mainly due to
rising VaRs where in most cases, systemic risk betas are either time-invariant (accord-
ing to the tests above) or even slightly declining from 2007 to 2008. Hence, companies’
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marginal contribution to the system VaR systemic risk contributions is widely unchanged
while their exposure to idiosyncratic risk has been dramatically increased. The first three
companies in the 2008 ranking, Regions Financial, AIG and Bank of America, are good
examples for companies realizing quite different combinations of marginal systemic con-
tributions and idiosyncratic tail risk levels and thus facing different sources for systemic
relevance. In case of Regions Financial, we observe a combination of both a compara-
bly high systemic risk beta and high VaR. Conversely, AIG’s marginal systemic effect
is clearly lower but its potential losses are significantly higher which in turn induce sub-
stantial risks for the entire system. Finally, Bank of America reveals the by far highest
systemic risk beta in combination with a moderate VaR. This bank is systemically risky
due to a high sensitivity of the system to Bank of America’s risk exposure though its
idiosyncratic risk level is not necessarily alarmingly high.
Bringing moreover together these results with the findings from the network analysis in
Section (D.2) yields even deeper insights into the underlying sources of firms’ increased
systemic importance. In particular, we can identify firms whose increased systemic rel-
evance is mainly due to a strong increase of their idiosyncratic risk as a result of worse
fim-specific and macroeconomic conditions in combination with widely unchanged sys-
temic risk betas. For instance, according to our network analysis, Regions Financial does
not face significant risk spillovers from other companies and thus exclusively depends on
micro- and macroeconomic externalities. As a result, the company’s high systemic rele-
vance in 2008 is due to the combination of a moderately high systemic risk beta and severe
idiosyncratic risk which in turn affect balance sheets and obligations of other firms. Like-
wise, Bank of America is not driven by tail risk spillovers from others and is increasingly
systemic important exclusively due to firm-specific and macroeconomic conditions.
A second category of firms are institutions whose strong increases of VaRs and thus
standardized systemic risk betas are not necessarily only due to economic conditions but
likely also due to network effects. According to our framework the latter are included
in form of (LASSO-selected) loss exceedances of other firms causing VaRs to jump up
whenever corresponding network neighbors get under distress and exceed their (uncondi-
tional 10%) loss quantile. These effects are likely being relevant for AIG facing a strong
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increase of its VaR which in turn receives tail risk spillovers, for instance, from Freddie
Mac. Further candidates are, e.g., E Trade Financial, Zions or Morgan Stanley being
exposed to substantial tail risk spillovers and realizing strong increases in their VaRs.
Finally, we identify companies facing not only rising idiosyncratic risk but also clear
variations in their systemic risk betas. A notable case is Fifth Third Bancorporation fac-
ing a 15-fold increase in its marginal risk contribution in combination with a tripled VaR.
Likewise, also the brokerage Charles Schwab is a company showing strong increases in
both VaRs and systemic risk betas.
Hence, though standardized systemic risk betas conveniently condense information on
banks’ systemic relevance, the underlying driving forces of a bank’s changed systemic
importance can be quite different. Only simultaneously analyzing and monitoring (i)
network effects, (ii) sensitivity to micro- and macroeconomic conditions and (iii) time-
variations in systemic risk betas provide deeper insights into the specific role of companies
in the network and can build the basis for regulatory measures.
IV. Validity: Pre-Crisis Period
Over the course of the financial crisis 2007-2009, a number of large institutions defaulted,
were overtaken by others or supported by the government. As for our general empirical
study, we required data for all considered institutions to be available over the entire pe-
riod from beginning of 2000 to end of 2008, these companies could not be included.
Nevertheless, to validate and robustify our findings, we perform an additional analysis
by re-estimating the model for the time period of January 1, 2000, to June 30, 2007 and
including the investment banks Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.
Because of the shorter estimation period, differences between estimated systemic risk
contributions are not as pronounced as in the analysis covering the full time period. There-
fore, as a sharp ranking of companies might not very meaningful and hard to interpret in
this context, Table XII rather categorizes firms into groups with systemic risk contri-
butions of related size. Accordingly, we can distinguish between three broad classes:
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Firstly, there are 11 companies with VaRs that significantly influence the system VaR and
additionally have comparably large standardized systemic risk beta. The most prominent
members of this group are Freddie Mac and JP Morgan. The second group comprises sys-
temically risky companies with significant and positive standardized systemic risk betas
mainly clustering around the value 0.02. According to the estimates reported in Table IX,
these magnitudes reflect a comparably high systemic relevance. This group contains most
of the large depositories and investment banks in our sample including, Bank of America,
AIG, Morgan Stanley, among others, but also Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Fannie
Mae. Finally, group 3 includes all companies with either insignificant or even negative
(average) systemic risk betas, which are not considered as being systemically risky during
the analyzed time period.
In detail, we focus on five companies which were massively affected by the crisis:
Lehman Brothers became insolvent on September 15, 2008, and was liquidated after-
wards. Merrill Lynch announced a merger with Bank of America in September 2008,
which was executed on January 1, 2009. Furthermore, excluding the crisis period itself
might remove some specific features of the data, such as structural changes for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac due to their placement under conservatorship by the U.S. govern-
ment. Finally, it is interesting to investigate the systemic riskiness of AIG, which faced
major distress during the crisis and whose bailout was very expensive for the tax payers.
As shown by Table XII (with the specific companies marked in bold), all of these firms
belong to the group of systemically relevant firms.
Table XIII summarizes the results of our empirical analysis for the five case study can-
didates using only the pre-crisis data. Our network analysis reveals that almost all of the
companies are subject to loss spillovers from direct competitors: While Freddie Mac is
not influenced by risk transmission of others, Fannie Mae is driven by loss exceedances of
Freddie Mac. TD Ameritrade Holding (AMTD), Charles Schwab (SCHW) and E Trade
Financial (ETFC) are large online brokers which operate on the same market as Lehman
and Merrill Lynch and are identified as significant tail risk producers. Likewise, we iden-
tify bi-directional tail risk dependencies between Lehman and Morgan Stanley, being one
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of Lehman’s main competitors and the second largest investment bank in the U.S. during
the estimation period.
All of the five companies of interest have a significant impact on the system. Orders
of magnitude of reported standardized systemic risk betas14 place all of these companies
even among the top group of systemically most relevant firms. Focussing particularly on
Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, we show the time evolution of their standardized
risk betas in Figure 9. Similarly, Figure 10 shows the time series pattern of the respective
VaRs. It turns out that the standardized systemic risk beta of Lehman steadily increases
from 2005 to 2007. Interestingly, its VaR only increases in the second half of 2005 but
remains widely on the same level afterwards. Hence, its growing systemic relevance is
mainly due to rising marginal effects on the system and is not reflected in Lehman’s
idiosyncratic risk exposure. The jumps in the VaR (and thus also in the standardized
risk beta) are induced by relevant loss exceedances which only occur whenever one of
Lehman’s tail risk drivers (e.g., Morgan Stanley) exceeds his (unconditional 10%) loss
quantile. This discreteness reflects the company’s tail risk sensitivity to loss exceedances
of competitors.
In case of Merrill Lynch, we observe high levels of both, systemic risk beta and VaR
in 2005, followed by a gradual decline until the mid of 2006. However, as for Lehman
Brothers, we observe clear differences in the paths of both risk measures in the second
half of the period. While the VaR of Merrill Lynch declines even further, its standardized
risk beta increases by more than 100% from mid of 2006 to mid of 2007. Hence, also
here, the (standardized) systemic risk beta reveals information on the company’s systemic
importance which cannot be detected by an analysis of the VaR solely. This finding
strongly backs the usefulness of our proposed measure.
From these results, which are produced only from pre-crisis data, it is possible to infer
that in June 2007, each of the five financial institutions of interest were relevant for the
stability of the U.S. financial system. Our findings indicate, firstly, that bailouts during the
crisis were justified for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG. Also a failure of Merrill Lynch
14In case of time-varying betas for Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac and Merrill Lynch, we report the
corresponding time series averages.
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would have led to harsh systemic consequences which could be prevented by its merger
with Bank of America in 2008. Secondly, the increasing systemic importance of Lehman
Brothers could have been monitored and thus the impact of its bankruptcy could have
been anticipated to a certain extent. The direct bi-directional linkage to Morgan Stanley,
which in turn is one of the most interconnected companies in our sample, indicates a
high risk for contagion as a result of Lehman’s failure. Furthermore, our estimates show
that Lehman’s systemic risk contribution is even slightly higher than that of AIG. Given
these results, bailing out the latter but not the former is not necessarily justifiable. If
these results had existed in advance, more effective regulatory measures could have been
performed possibly reducing the extent of the financial crisis.
V. Conclusion
The worldwide financial crisis 2007-2009 has revealed that there is a need for a better
understanding of systemic risk. Particularly in situations of distress, it is the intercon-
nectedness of financial companies which plays a major role but challenges quantitative
analysis and the construction of appropriate risk measures.
In this paper, we propose a measure of firms’ systemic relevance which accounts for
dependence structures within the financial network given market externalities. Our anal-
ysis allows to statistically identify relevant channels of potential tail risk spillovers be-
tween firms constituting the topology of the financial network. Based on these relevant
company-specific risk drivers, we measure a firm’s idiosyncratic tail risk by explicitly ac-
counting for its interconnectedness with other institutions. Our measure for a company’s
systemic risk contribution quantifies the impact on the risk of distress of the system in-
duced by an increase in the risk of the specific company in a network setting. Both mea-
sures exclusively rely on publicly observable balance sheet and market characteristics and
can thus be used for predictions in a stress test scenario.
Our empirical results show the interconnectedness of the U.S. financial system and
clearly mark channels of relevant potential risk spillovers. In particular, we can clas-
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sify companies into major risk producers, transmitters or recipients within the system.
Moreover, at any specific point in time, firms can be ranked according to their estimated
contribution to systemic risk given their role and position in the network. Monitoring
companies’ systemic relevance over time, thus allows to detect those firms which are
most central for the stability of the system. In a case study, we highlight that our ap-
proach could have served as a solid basis for sensible forward-looking regulation before
the start of the financial crisis in 2007.
Our approach is readily extendable in several directions. In particular, although the
financial system is dominated by the U.S, it truly is a global business with many firms
operating internationally. Currently we are collecting data on a global level. Detecting
inter- and intra-country risk connections and measuring firms’ global systemic relevance,
should be straightforward with our proposed methodology. Moreover, whenever addi-
tional (firm-specific or market-wide) information is available as, e.g., reported to central
banks, it can be directly incorporated into our measurement procedure. The data-driven
selection step of relevant risk drivers then determines if and how it increases the precision
of results.
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Appendix A. Statistical Large Sample Results
Under the adaptive choice of penalty parameter as described in the text, the LASSO selection
method is consistent with rate OP (
√
K(i)
T log(max(K,T )), and with high probability the coeffi-
cients selected of W, contain the the true coefficients also in finite samples. These results follow
directly from Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011). Furthermore, V aRi is consistently estimated
by the post-LASSO method described in the text which re-estimates the unrestricted model with
W(i). In particular, for all q ∈ I with I ∈ (0, 1) being compact,
ξˆ
i
q − ξiq ≤ OP (
√
K(i)
T
log(max(K,T ))), (A1)
since in our setting it is safe to assume that the number of wrongly selected components of W is
stochastically bounded by the number K(i) of components of W contained in the true model for
V aRi (see equation (2.16) in Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011)). We write in a slight abuse of
notation YT ≤ OP (rT ), for YT is either OP (rT ) or even oP (rT ) for any random sequence YT
and deterministic rT → 0. Note that in general for T → ∞ both K nor K(i) might grow only
extremely slowly in T , such that they can be treated close to being constants implying the standard
oracle bound OP (
√
log(T )
T ) in (A1).
If the true model is selected, we find for the asymptotic distribution of the individual VaR
estimates for any q ∈ [0, 1],15
√
1
T
(
ξˆ
i
q − ξiq
)′ → N (0, q(1− q)
g2(G−1(q))
E[W(i)W(i)
′
]−1
)
, (A2)
where g(G−1(q)) denotes the density of the corresponding error εi distribution at the qth quantile.
This result is standard (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978). For the second step estimates, we derive
the asymptotic distribution analogously to the two-step median results in Powell (1983)
√
K(i)
T
(
(βˆ
s|i
0,p,q, ηˆ
s|i
p,q, γˆ
s
p)
′ − (βs|i0,p,q,ηs|ip,q,γsp)
′)
(A3)
→ N
(
0, Q−1E
[
p(1− p)
f2(F−1(p))
ρp(ε
s
t )−
p(1− p)
g2(G−1(p))
βs|ip,q
′ (
ρp(ε
i
t), ρ
v
p(Zt−1ε
i
t)
)])
, (A4)
15Required assumptions of Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) and quantile analogies to Powell (1983)
are fulfilled in our setting.
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where in the scalar factor, f(F−1(p)) is the density of the corresponding error εs at the pth quan-
tile, the function ρvp of a vector applies ρp to each of its components, and β
s|i
p,q = (β
s|i
0,p,q,η
s|i
p,q). The
remaining main part Q in the variance is given by Q = H ′E[AA′]H with A = (W(i), vec(Zt−1 ·
W(i)
′
),VaR(−i)). Denote by I and 0 identity and null matrices, respectively, and by 1 a vector of
ones of appropriate dimension. Then,
H ′ =

diag(ξiq,2) 0 · · ·0 · · · · · ·0 · · ·
0 diag(ξiq,1) · · ·0 · · · · · ·0 · · ·
0 0 diag(vec(1dz · ξiq ′)) · · ·0 · · ·
I 0 · · ·0 · · · · · ·0 · · ·
0 0 · · ·0 · · · Id(−i)×d(−i)

where dZ is the dimension of Z which is 3 in our application, d(−i) is the dimension of VaR
(−i)
t ,
and coefficients ξiq,2 are those components of ξ
i
q for regressors which appear both in the first and
the second step. Correspondingly ξiq,1 are coefficients of regressors which just appear in the first
step of the individual VaR regression. Note that in the variance matrix there is a distinction in γ
for parts of V which are also controls in V aRi and VaR(−i)t , which just appear in V aRs.
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Appendix B. Tables and Figures
Table I: Included financial institutions.
Depositories (21) Others (11) Insurance Comp. (20)
BB T Corp (BBT) American Express Co (AXP) AFLAC Inc (AFL)
Bank of New York Mellon (BK) Eaton Vance Corp (EV) Allstate Corp (ALL)
Bank of America Corp (BAC) Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp (FRE) American International Group (AIG)
Citigroup Inc (C) Fed. National Mortgage Assn (FNM) AON Corp (AON)
Comerica Inc (CMA) Fifth Third Bancorp (FITB) Berkley WR Corp (WRB)
Hudson City Bancorp Inc. (HCBK) Franklin Resources Inc (BEN) CIGNA Corp (CI)
Huntington Bancshares Inc. (HBAN) Legg Mason Inc (LM) C N A Financial Corp. (CNA)
JP Morgan Chase & Co (JPM) Leucadia National Corp (LUK) Chubb Corp (CB)
M & T Bank Corp. (MTB) SEI Investments Company (SEIC) Cincinnati Financial Corp (CINF)
Marshall & Ilsley Corp (MI) TD Ameritrade Holding Corp (AMTD) Coventry Health Care Inc (CVH)
NY Community Bankcorp (NYB) Union Pacific Corp (UNP) Hartford Financial (HIG)
Northern Trust Corp (NTRS) HEALTH NET INC (HNT)
Peoples United Financial Inc. (PBCT) Broker-Dealers (7) Humana Inc (HUM)
PNC Financial Services Group (PNC) E Trade Financial Corp (ETFC) Lincoln National Corp. (LNC)
Financial Corp New (RF) Goldman Sachs Group Inc (GS) Loews Corp (L)
S L M Corp. Lehman Brothers (LEH)∗ Marsh & McLennan Inc. (MMC)
State Street Corp (STT) Merrill Lynch (ML)∗ MBIA Inc (MBI)
Suntrust Banks Inc (STI) Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co (MS) Progressive Corp Ohio (PGR)
Synovus Financial Corp (SNV) Schwab Charles Corp New (SCHW) Torchmark Corp (TMK)
Wells Fargo & Co (WFC) T Rowe Price Group Inc. (TROW) Unum Group (UNM)
Zions Bancorp (ZION)
∗ included only in the case study
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Table II: Backtest results for V aRi models. Coverage should be close to
the underlying quantile level 0.05. A higher p-value indicates a better model
fit in the sense that the model generates a good coverage and conditionally
independent VaR-exceedances.
Name coverage LR test p-value
Broker Dealers
E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.041 0.7812
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. 0.05 0.8081
MORGAN STANLEY 0.067 0.1286
CHARLES SCHWAB 0.054 0.661
T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.043 0.5349
Depositories
BANK OF AMERICA 0.054 0.4907
BB &T 0.054 0.8197
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 0.041 0.5557
CITIGROUP 0.045 0.5841
COMERICA 0.043 0.797
HUNTINGTON BCSH. 0.045 0.9471
HUDSON CITY BANC. 0.045 0.6129
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 0.045 0.818
MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.052 0.7088
M & T BK. 0.047 0.4802
NORTHERN TRUST 0.056 0.9682
NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.05 0.9531
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL 0.056 0.3321
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.054 0.9863
REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.05 0.9608
SLM 0.058 0.3992
SYNOVUS FINL. 0.041 0.7573
SUNTRUST BANKS 0.056 0.6276
STATE STREET 0.052 0.999
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.047 0.8023
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.043 0.5897
Insurance Companies
AFLAC 0.052 0.6735
AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.052 0.3752
ALLSTATE 0.041 0.5207
AON 0.054 0.9437
CHUBB 0.06 0.855
CIGNA 0.056 0.514
CINCINNATI FINL. 0.069 0.4956
CNA FINANCIAL 0.054 0.9321
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.056 0.8685
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.045 0.8125
HEALTH NET 0.045 0.8158
HUMANA 0.058 0.6934
LOEWS 0.045 0.9416
LINCOLN NAT. 0.058 0.4631
MBIA 0.045 0.8158
MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.067 0.6159
PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.047 0.9732
TORCHMARK 0.047 0.7494
UNUM GROUP 0.045 0.8164
W R BERKLEY 0.052 0.9827
Others
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING 0.039 0.2879
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.039 0.8469
FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.062 0.783
EATON VANCE NV. 0.041 0.7105
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.052 0.9981
FANNIE MAE 0.045 0.7251
FREDDIE MAC 0.047 0.8117
LEGG MASON 0.056 0.826
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.052 0.8207
SEI INVESTMENTS 0.054 0.6092
UNION PACIFIC 0.058 0.7084
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Table III: Exemplary post-LASSO quantile regressions for V aRi with
q = 0.05 for broker dealers and depositories. Regressors were selected by
LASSO. Ex.j stands for loss exceedance of company j. For a description of
the other regressors, see Section B.
Goldman Sachs
Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.0281 0.0282 0.9963 0.3196
Ex.AIG -0.0842 0.1520 -0.5537 0.5800
Ex.MS -0.4974 0.0787 -6.3186 0.0000
LEV 0.0017 0.0010 1.7860 0.0748
housing 0.0001 0.0002 0.9030 0.3670
vix 0.0020 0.0005 3.8849 0.0001
Morgan Stanley
Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value
(Intercept) -0.0476 0.0490 -0.9721 0.3315
Ex.AIG -0.1570 0.0239 -6.5597 0.0000
Ex.BAC -0.5824 0.2016 -2.8885 0.0041
Ex.CNA -0.3295 0.2683 -1.2280 0.2201
Ex.ETFC -0.0779 0.0834 -0.9339 0.3509
Ex.EV -0.1774 0.1585 -1.1192 0.2637
Ex.GS -0.4743 0.1449 -3.2742 0.0011
Ex.LM 0.0472 0.1120 0.4215 0.6736
Ex.LNC 0.0734 0.2459 0.2983 0.7656
Ex.SCHW -0.3780 0.1446 -2.6138 0.0093
Ex.SEIC -0.1974 0.1281 -1.5412 0.1240
LEV -0.0003 0.0014 -0.2229 0.8237
BM -0.0045 0.0130 -0.3465 0.7291
housing 0.0002 0.0002 1.4985 0.1347
vix 0.0002 0.0009 0.2352 0.8142
repo -0.0017 0.0248 -0.0699 0.9443
credit 0.1051 0.0572 1.8360 0.0670
JP Morgan
Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value
(Intercept) -0.0128 0.0150 -0.8513 0.3950
Ex.C -0.3992 0.1992 -2.0046 0.0456
Ex.GS -0.2628 0.1461 -1.7985 0.0728
Ex.SCHW -0.2366 0.0747 -3.1669 0.0016
BM -0.0200 0.0145 -1.3789 0.1686
housing 0.0000 0.0001 0.2900 0.7719
vix 0.0024 0.0006 4.3071 0.0000
Bank of New York Mellon
Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value
(Intercept) -0.0235 0.0158 -1.4902 0.1369
Ex.AXP -0.0654 0.0862 -0.7586 0.4485
Ex.BBT -0.1990 0.1346 -1.4781 0.1401
Ex.FNM -0.0106 0.0639 -0.1655 0.8686
Ex.GS -0.1104 0.1341 -0.8232 0.4108
Ex.HIG 0.1311 0.0878 1.4932 0.1361
Ex.JPM -0.0986 0.0710 -1.3873 0.1660
Ex.L -0.2383 0.1506 -1.5828 0.1142
Ex.MS 0.0541 0.1059 0.5110 0.6096
Ex.NTRS -0.3676 0.1053 -3.4913 0.0005
Ex.SNV -0.3211 0.1398 -2.2967 0.0221
Ex.STT -0.1980 0.1594 -1.2425 0.2147
Ex.TROW -0.1208 0.1149 -1.0517 0.2935
LEV 0.0001 0.0013 0.0875 0.9303
housing 0.0001 0.0001 0.9721 0.3315
vix 0.0005 0.0005 0.9871 0.3241
repo -0.0150 0.0121 -1.2365 0.2169
term 0.0094 0.0155 0.6091 0.5428
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Table IV: Exemplary post-LASSO quantile regressions for V aRi with
q = 0.05 for insurance companies and others. Regressors were selected by
LASSO. Ex.j stands for loss exceedance of company j. For a description of
the other regressors, see Section B.
American International Group
Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value
(Intercept) 0.0803 0.0708 1.1345 0.2572
Ex.FRE -0.1719 0.4867 -0.3532 0.7241
Ex.MMC -0.5127 0.2553 -2.0079 0.0452
LEV 0.0081 0.0067 1.2064 0.2283
BM 0.0340 0.0138 2.4611 0.0142
housing -0.0003 0.0002 -1.3616 0.1740
vix 0.0022 0.0011 2.0514 0.0408
CNA Financial
Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value
(Intercept) -0.0257 0.0241 -1.0673 0.2864
Ex.HIG -0.4179 0.2805 -1.4899 0.1369
Ex.MBI -0.6330 0.1677 -3.7738 0.0002
LEV 0.0018 0.0040 0.4362 0.6629
BM -0.0038 0.0121 -0.3099 0.7568
housing 0.0001 0.0002 0.1857 0.8527
vix 0.0003 0.0007 0.4478 0.6545
Fannie Mae
Value Std. Error t-value p-value
(Intercept) -0.0504 0.0093 -5.4426 0.0000
Ex.C -0.0972 0.2161 -0.4497 0.6531
Ex.FRE -0.9086 0.0097 -93.6342 0.0000
Ex.JPM -0.2234 0.1814 -1.2313 0.2189
Ex.MS -0.0562 0.2195 -0.2560 0.7981
Y.t.FNM.lag -0.0348 0.0270 -1.2887 0.1982
LEV -0.0002 0.0003 -0.5946 0.5524
BM -0.0032 0.0051 -0.6199 0.5357
housing 0.0001 0.0001 1.0453 0.2964
vix -0.0001 0.0005 -0.1534 0.8781
repo 0.0780 0.0238 3.2730 0.0011
SEI Investments
Value Std. Error t-ratio p-value
(Intercept) 0.3706 0.3337 1.1105 0.2673
Ex.MS -0.5054 0.2634 -1.9188 0.0556
SIZE 0.0164 0.0144 1.1442 0.2531
housing 0.0004 0.0002 2.2166 0.0271
vix 0.0029 0.0010 2.8148 0.0051
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Table V: Summary statistics for estimated individual time series of V aRi.
Name Mean Standard dev. Min 10% quant. 90% quant. Max.
Broker Dealers
E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.108 0.066 0.046 0.062 0.172 0.809
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. 0.061 0.038 0.033 0.041 0.092 0.573
MORGAN STANLEY 0.068 0.065 0.020 0.036 0.119 0.905
CHARLES SCHWAB 0.094 0.045 0.041 0.055 0.140 0.335
T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.062 0.042 0.035 0.039 0.091 0.583
BANK OF AMERICA 0.062 0.037 0.023 0.031 0.100 0.270
Depositories
BB &T 0.058 0.027 0.015 0.031 0.093 0.192
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 0.047 0.033 -0.051 0.029 0.076 0.269
CITIGROUP 0.055 0.062 0.024 0.028 0.098 0.926
COMERICA 0.055 0.037 0.023 0.031 0.080 0.392
HUNTINGTON BCSH. 0.076 0.044 0.010 0.026 0.142 0.245
HUDSON CITY BANC. 0.040 0.015 0.023 0.028 0.055 0.132
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 0.060 0.045 0.023 0.027 0.094 0.561
MARSHALL & ILSLEY 0.071 0.028 0.024 0.037 0.111 0.134
M & T BK. 0.049 0.023 0.024 0.031 0.069 0.316
NORTHERN TRUST 0.067 0.028 0.032 0.042 0.094 0.224
NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.057 0.034 0.030 0.040 0.094 0.374
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL 0.048 0.021 0.005 0.027 0.077 0.123
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.052 0.043 0.011 0.025 0.084 0.645
REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.076 0.079 0.021 0.029 0.118 0.420
SLM 0.065 0.059 0.032 0.036 0.112 0.528
SYNOVUS FINL. 0.052 0.041 -0.021 0.025 0.081 0.412
SUNTRUST BANKS 0.060 0.046 0.021 0.032 0.106 0.615
STATE STREET 0.068 0.032 0.028 0.036 0.101 0.245
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.044 0.038 0.015 0.021 0.073 0.439
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.071 0.053 0.015 0.028 0.140 0.331
Insurance Companies
AFLAC 0.052 0.048 0.029 0.035 0.077 0.643
AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.078 0.103 0.020 0.033 0.111 0.691
ALLSTATE 0.045 0.048 0.000 0.027 0.076 0.781
AON 0.045 0.044 0.010 0.025 0.078 0.565
CHUBB 0.048 0.031 0.019 0.024 0.072 0.336
CIGNA 0.065 0.055 0.031 0.035 0.097 0.701
CINCINNATI FINL. 0.040 0.029 0.007 0.023 0.063 0.372
CNA FINANCIAL 0.058 0.063 0.036 0.037 0.087 0.653
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.087 0.089 0.027 0.034 0.159 0.875
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.083 0.163 0.029 0.034 0.151 2.509
HEALTH NET 0.088 0.029 0.047 0.058 0.118 0.238
HUMANA 0.075 0.048 0.042 0.050 0.108 0.570
LOEWS 0.051 0.025 0.014 0.025 0.077 0.183
LINCOLN NAT. 0.057 0.066 0.007 0.022 0.093 1.005
MBIA 0.100 0.122 0.030 0.043 0.220 1.670
MARSH & MCLENNAN 0.058 0.066 0.009 0.028 0.106 0.598
PROGRESSIVE OHIO 0.064 0.031 0.020 0.031 0.112 0.204
TORCHMARK 0.054 0.033 0.016 0.021 0.100 0.199
UNUM GROUP 0.080 0.069 0.023 0.038 0.134 0.835
W R BERKLEY 0.052 0.019 0.023 0.036 0.073 0.271
Others
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING 0.098 0.062 -0.026 0.045 0.181 0.454
AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.049 0.041 0.009 0.019 0.088 0.416
FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.053 0.035 0.029 0.036 0.079 0.427
EATON VANCE NV. 0.054 0.033 0.007 0.037 0.076 0.477
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.082 0.073 0.015 0.030 0.149 0.476
FANNIE MAE 0.077 0.126 0.019 0.038 0.107 2.253
FREDDIE MAC 0.079 0.174 0.033 0.039 0.092 3.233
LEGG MASON 0.081 0.050 0.034 0.045 0.122 0.72
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.044 0.037 0.020 0.023 0.073 0.419
SEI INVESTMENTS 0.072 0.040 0.034 0.044 0.106 0.553
UNION PACIFIC 0.056 0.021 0.027 0.036 0.08 0.187
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Table VI: Tail risk cross dependencies: Loss exceedances of companies on the right hand-side have
been selected by LASSO as regressors for the V aRi-model (q=0.05) of companies on the left hand-side.
Name Influencing companies
Broker Dealers
E TRADE FINANCIAL AMTD, C, FNM, MS
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. AIG, MS
MORGAN STANLEY AIG, BAC, CNA, ETFC, EV, GS, LM, LNC, SCHW, SEIC
CHARLES SCHWAB AMTD
T ROWE PRICE GP. HIG, LM, MBI, MS
Depositories
BANK OF AMERICA
BB &T
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON AXP, BBT, FNM, GS, HIG, JPM, L, MS, NTRS, SNV, STT, TROW
CITIGROUP ETFC, HIG, JPM, LNC, MBI
COMERICA FRE, HBAN, MBI, MS, RF
HUNTINGTON BCSH.
HUDSON CITY BANC.
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. C, GS, SCHW
MARSHALL & ILSLEY
M & T BK. MS
NORTHERN TRUST
NY.CMTY.BANC. HIG, LNC, PBCT
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP C
REGIONS FINANCIAL
SLM ETFC, FNM, LNC, MBI
SYNOVUS FINL. CMA, FITB, FRE, RF, ZION
SUNTRUST BANKS LNC
STATE STREET
WELLS FARGO & CO BAC, C, FNM, LNC, MBI, STI
ZIONS BANCORP.
Insurance Companies
AFLAC HIG
AMERICAN INTL.GP. FRE, MMC
ALLSTATE CNA, CVH, LNC, MS, UNM
AON AMTD, CMA, HBAN, MBI, MS, RF, STI, UNM
CHUBB AMTD, EV, HBAN, HIG, MBI, UNM
CIGNA CVH, HIG, LNC, MS
CINCINNATI FINL. AXP, CMA, CNA, CVH, HIG, LM, MBI, TROW
CNA FINANCIAL HIG, MBI
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE CI, FITB, HNT, HUM, MMC, SEIC
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. LNC
HEALTH NET
HUMANA CVH, LNC, UNM
LOEWS
LINCOLN NAT. C, HIG, MS
MBIA FRE
MARSH & MCLENNAN AXP, JPM, MI, MS, SCHW, SEIC, TROW, UNM
PROGRESSIVE OHIO
TORCHMARK
UNUM GROUP HIG
W R BERKLEY MS, UNM
Others
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING AON, ETFC, MBI, RF, SCHW, TROW, UNM
AMERICAN EXPRESS AMTD, BBT, ETFC, EV, HIG, LNC, MBI, SCHW, STT
FRANKLIN RESOURCES AMTD, HIG, LM, LNC, MBI, UNM
EATON VANCE NV. CB, HBAN, LM, LNC, MS, SEIC, SLM, UNM
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP
FANNIE MAE C, FRE, JPM, MS
FREDDIE MAC FNM
LEGG MASON MS
LEUCADIA NATIONAL C, CVH, ETFC, MBI, SEIC
SEI INVESTMENTS MS
UNION PACIFIC ETFC, HIG
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Table VII: Estimates of parameters βs|i0 and ηs|i and p-values for the test on systemic relevance (joint
significance of V̂ aR
i
t and V̂ aR
i
t · Zit−1, Hypothesis H1) with Zit−1 = (MMMt−1, SIZEt−1, LEVt−1)′
and for the test on time-variations of systemic risk betas (significance of V̂ aR
i
t · Zit−1, Hypothesis H2).
Name βˆs|i0 ηˆ
s|i
MMM ηˆ
s|i
SIZE ηˆ
s|i
LEV pvH1 pvH2
Systemically relevant companies with time-varying βs|it
AMERICAN EXPRESS -6.284 0.195 0.278 -0.087 0.001 0.024
AMERICAN INTL.GP. -0.276 -2.352 0.078 -0.008 0.004 0.023
BANK OF AMERICA -41.872 15.230 1.140 0.043 0.016 0.007
CHARLES SCHWAB 9.824 1.453 -0.457 0.165 0.000 0.000
CINCINNATI FINL. -18.766 2.370 0.820 -0.623 0.008 0.005
COMERICA 4.775 1.038 -0.170 -0.088 0.012 0.012
E TRADE FINANCIAL -0.549 -0.088 0.028 0.009 0.013 0.068
EATON VANCE NV. 0.083 -0.520 0.013 -0.054 0.000 0.017
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.828 3.978 -0.178 0.076 0.022 0.027
FRANKLIN RESOURCES -3.201 0.746 0.136 0.201 0.002 0.007
HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. -1.556 0.132 0.059 -0.005 0.017 0.004
HUDSON CITY BANC. -55.089 -0.336 2.010 -0.206 0.004 0.005
HUNTINGTON BCSH. -7.751 4.295 0.255 -0.267 0.035 0.048
LEGG MASON 3.664 -0.091 -0.158 -0.019 0.020 0.005
NORTHERN TRUST -16.221 -1.229 0.397 0.331 0.017 0.010
NY.CMTY.BANC. -3.918 -1.383 0.196 0.020 0.007 0.009
PROGRESSIVE OHIO -0.976 2.264 -0.220 1.096 0.001 0.001
SLM -2.677 0.091 0.115 -0.006 0.001 0.018
STATE STREET -29.239 0.319 1.086 -0.011 0.007 0.015
SUNTRUST BANKS -2.692 1.424 0.088 -0.048 0.100 0.057
T ROWE PRICE GP. 5.256 0.471 -0.194 -0.506 0.013 0.069
UNION PACIFIC 9.511 -3.012 -0.271 -0.354 0.010 0.005
UNUM GROUP -4.424 1.434 0.174 -0.134 0.066 0.078
Systemically relevant companies with constant βs|i
AON -2.170 0.250 0.093 -0.007 0.002 0.606
CITIGROUP -1.406 -0.143 0.052 0.015 0.021 0.513
CNA FINANCIAL -4.609 -0.525 0.207 0.011 0.028 0.629
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE -0.031 -0.379 -0.018 0.299 0.038 0.440
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 6.671 -3.174 -0.161 0.028 0.015 0.200
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 6.281 -0.332 -0.259 -0.136 0.015 0.064
LINCOLN NAT. -2.798 0.374 0.117 -0.016 0.043 0.159
MORGAN STANLEY 1.702 0.722 -0.072 0.003 0.002 0.670
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 3.564 -0.233 -0.108 -0.029 0.075 0.619
REGIONS FINANCIAL -2.703 4.349 0.012 -0.044 0.081 0.422
TORCHMARK -25.555 5.501 0.828 0.195 0.082 0.120
WELLS FARGO & CO -6.158 2.252 0.168 0.018 0.013 0.120
ZIONS BANCORP. -2.892 12.997 -0.255 -0.047 0.049 0.101
No significant influence
AFLAC -7.339 8.078 0.099 -0.197 0.145
ALLSTATE -2.933 3.427 0.003 0.028 0.145
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON 1.094 0.083 -0.038 -0.006 0.373
BB &T -29.215 9.828 0.977 0.204 0.204
CHUBB -4.724 0.388 0.167 0.057 0.708
CIGNA 2.173 1.147 -0.129 0.001 0.479
FANNIE MAE -0.508 -0.036 0.018 0.001 0.446
FREDDIE MAC -5.977 -0.514 0.226 -0.006 0.198
GOLDMAN SACHS GP. -8.046 1.209 0.283 -0.023 0.124
HEALTH NET -2.620 3.060 -0.063 0.248 0.229
HUMANA 0.735 -0.681 -0.042 0.116 0.339
LOEWS 17.257 -2.698 -0.449 -0.204 0.320
M & T BK. -3.37 -3.296 0.168 0.135 0.149
MARSH & MCLENNAN 1.148 0.415 -0.053 0.012 0.410
MARSHALL & ILSLEY 5.490 -3.533 -0.235 0.250 0.227
MBIA -0.580 0.153 0.033 -0.008 0.167
PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL 15.921 0.302 -0.690 -0.046 0.233
SEI INVESTMENTS -1.365 0.006 0.062 -0.029 0.878
SYNOVUS FINL. -0.111 -0.297 0.044 -0.047 0.619
TD AMERITRADE HOLDING 0.492 -0.089 -0.013 -0.005 0.309
W R BERKLEY 1.437 2.086 -0.077 -0.116 0.648
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Table VIII: Estimates of time-invariant systemic risk betas βs|i
for the cases where the hypothesis of no time variation ηs|i 6= 0
could not be rejected (see the last column in Table VII)
Name βˆs|i p-value
AON 0.257 0.000
CITIGROUP 0.287 0.036
CNA FINANCIAL 0.218 0.013
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.118 0.011
JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. 0.311 0.006
LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.109 0.088
LINCOLN NAT. 0.179 0.018
MORGAN STANLEY 0.207 0.000
PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.291 0.070
REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.448 0.033
TORCHMARK 0.236 0.361
WELLS FARGO & CO 0.181 0.022
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.380 0.096
Table IX: Ranking of average systemic risk contributions based on standardized systemic risk betas.
The third column lists loss exceedances that are included in the respective company’s V aRi-regression.
Estimation period 2000-2008.
Rank Name ̂¯βs|iav influencing companies
1 BANK OF AMERICA 0.0873
2 UNION PACIFIC 0.0351 ETFC, HIG
3 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.0341
4 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.0268
5 E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.0230 AMTD, C, FRE, MBI, MS, SCHW
6 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.0209 AMTD
7 JP MORGAN CHASE 0.0187 C, GS, SCHW
8 AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.0172 AMTD, BBT, ETFC, EV, HIG, LNC, MBI, SCHW, STT
9 EATON VANCE NV. 0.0161 CB, HBAN, LM, LNC, MS, SEIC, SLM, UNM
10 CITIGROUP 0.0158 ETFC, HIG, JPM, LNC, MBI
11 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.0152 C
12 MORGAN STANLEY 0.0142 AIG, BAC, CNA, ETFC, EV, GS, LM, LNC, SCHW, SEIC
13 SLM 0.0133 ETFC, FNM, LNC, MBI
14 COMERICA 0.0129 FRE, HBAN, MBI, MS, RF
15 CNA FINANCIAL 0.0125 HIG, MBI
16 AON 0.0117 AMTD, CMA, HBAN, MBI, MS, RF, STI, UNM
17 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.0113 FRE, MMC
18 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.0102 CI, FITB, HNT, HUM, MMC, SEIC
19 LINCOLN NAT. 0.0102 C, HIG, MS
20 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.0099 AMTD, HIG, LM, LNC, MBI, UNM
21 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.0098 HIG, LNC, PBCT
22 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.0096 HIG, LM, MBI, MS
23 WELLS FARGO & CO. 0.0079 BAC, C, FNM, LNC, MBI, STI
24 SUNTRUST BANKS 0.0074 LNC
25 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.0071 AXP, CMA, CNA, CVH, HIG, LM, MBI, TROW
26 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.0057
27 LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.0053 C, CVH, ETFC, MBI, SEIC
28 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.0005 LNC
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Table X: Ranking of systemic risk contributions based on estimated standardized systemic
risk betas (̂¯βs|it ), end of May 2007 (before the beginning of the financial crisis). Estimated
systemic risk betas and VaRs are listed in addition, to illustrate the different sources of
variation in ̂¯βs|it .
Rank Name ̂¯βs|i2007 βˆs|i2007 V̂ aRi2007
1 BANK OF AMERICA 0.0645 1.6068 0.0401
2 UNION PACIFIC 0.0441 0.7466 0.0590
3 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.0262 0.3247 0.0807
4 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.0179 0.3795 0.0472
5 EATON VANCE NV. 0.0163 0.3280 0.0496
6 E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.0154 0.2397 0.0644
7 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.0150 0.4477 0.0336
8 AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.0149 0.3688 0.0403
9 SLM 0.0142 0.2498 0.0567
10 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.0104 0.2471 0.0421
11 JP MORGAN CHASE 0.0100 0.3107 0.0323
12 CITIGROUP 0.0100 0.2875 0.0348
13 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.0099 0.2268 0.0436
14 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.0094 0.2349 0.0402
15 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.0094 0.2907 0.0324
16 AON 0.0089 0.2573 0.0347
17 MORGAN STANLEY 0.0088 0.2070 0.0425
18 CNA FINANCIAL 0.0084 0.2177 0.0385
19 CINCINNATI FINL. 0.0079 0.2252 0.0353
20 SUNTRUST BANKS 0.0076 0.2197 0.0346
21 COMERICA 0.0057 0.1954 0.0292
22 WELLS FARGO & CO 0.0051 0.1806 0.0283
23 LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.0051 0.1365 0.0373
24 LINCOLN NAT. 0.0038 0.1795 0.0211
25 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.0034 0.1176 0.0292
26 UNUM GROUP 0.0026 0.0849 0.0309
27 HARTFORD FINL.SVS.GP. 0.0019 0.0535 0.0363
28 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.0014 0.0327 0.0432
29 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.0011 0.0177 0.0604
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Table XI: Ranking of systemic risk contributions based on estimated standardized
systemic risk betas (̂¯βs|it ), end of September 2008 (at the height of the financial crisis).
Estimated systemic risk betas and VaRs are listed in addition, to illustrate the different
sources of variation in ̂¯βs|it .
Rank Name ̂¯βs|i2008 βˆs|i2008 V̂ aRi2008
1 REGIONS FINANCIAL 0.1503 0.4477 0.3356
2 AMERICAN INTL.GP. 0.1316 0.1903 0.6911
3 BANK OF AMERICA 0.1205 1.2287 0.0980
4 E TRADE FINANCIAL 0.1004 0.2504 0.4011
5 ZIONS BANCORP. 0.0589 0.3795 0.1551
6 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 0.0575 0.2628 0.2189
7 SLM 0.0496 0.1377 0.3599
8 UNION PACIFIC 0.0480 0.6369 0.0753
9 CNA FINANCIAL 0.0423 0.2177 0.1941
10 WELLS FARGO & CO 0.0362 0.1806 0.2006
11 CHARLES SCHWAB 0.0315 0.5805 0.0542
12 MORGAN STANLEY 0.0251 0.2070 0.1211
13 PNC FINANCIAL SVS. GP 0.0235 0.2907 0.0807
14 JP MORGAN CHASE 0.0208 0.3107 0.0669
15 AON 0.0183 0.2573 0.0713
16 EATON VANCE NV. 0.0176 0.2774 0.0634
17 CITIGROUP 0.0172 0.2875 0.0600
18 AMERICAN EXPRESS 0.0170 0.3196 0.0532
19 COMERICA 0.0150 0.1046 0.1436
20 SUNTRUST BANKS 0.0150 0.1372 0.1094
21 COVENTRY HEALTH CARE 0.0141 0.1176 0.1202
22 LINCOLN NAT. 0.0134 0.1795 0.0749
23 FRANKLIN RESOURCES 0.0124 0.1572 0.0790
24 NY.CMTY.BANC. 0.0115 0.2264 0.0507
25 T ROWE PRICE GP. 0.0049 0.0313 0.1556
26 UNUM GROUP 0.0042 0.0671 0.0624
27 LEUCADIA NATIONAL 0.0009 0.0081 0.1056
Table XII: Group ranking of systemic risk contributions for the pre-crisis period 2000 - mid 2007.
The upper part, group 1, contains companies with significant βs|it and high
ˆ¯β
s|i
av . The middle part (group
2) lists companies with positive and significant βs|it , but smaller
ˆ¯β
s|i
av . Group 3 includes companies not
determined to be systemically risky during the estimation period, i.e., those with insignificant or negative
systemic risk betas. Case study companies are marked in bold.
Systemic risk contributions Companies
Group 1, ˆ¯βs|iav ∈ [0.034, 0.084] JPM, FRE, AXP, BBT, MTB, CINF, AFL, CVH, SLM, STI, LM
Group 2, ˆ¯βs|iav ∈ [0.004, 0.030]
BAC, C, AIG, MS, LEH, WFC, FNM, MBI, PGR, ML, BK,
AON, TROW, LUK, ETFC, WRB, NYB, ALL, SNV, BEN, CB,
TMK, LNC, UNM, AMTD, MI
Group 3
CMA, CNA, HBAN, L, SCHW, PNC, RF, STT, UNP, HNT, NTRS,
EV, GS, ZION, HUM, FITB, SEIC, HIG, PBCT, CI, HCBK, MMC
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Table XIII: Summary of estimation and test results for the five case study companies: loss exceedances
influencing each company’s VaR, other VaRs influenced, joint significance tests on βs|it = 0 and estimated
average systemic risk contributions and betas. Estimation period: January 2000 - June 2007.
Name incluenced by influences overall sign. average ̂¯βs|it average β̂s|it
FREDDIE FNM 0.004∗ 0.078 1.389
MERRILL AMTD 0.000∗ 0.026 1.472
LEHMAN AMTD, MS, SCHW GS, MS 0.009∗ 0.030 0.375
FANNIE FRE SLM 0.011 0.021 0.406
AIG ETFC, MMC ALL, BK, CB 0.025 0.021 0.403
∗time-varying betas
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Figure 4: Illustration of interpolated maturity mismatch times for Wells Fargo. Green:
actual data points, blue: interpolation spline, red: weekly aggregates.
52
Figure 5: Full network graph for the system of the 57 largest financial companies in the U.S. For simplicity, arrows only mark risk spillovers
effects without referring to their respective size. Otherwise arrows and colors are as defined in Figure 1. A complete list of firms’ acronyms
is contained in Table I. The graphical allocation is obtained via the Fruchtermann-Reingold algorithm which minimizes the total length of all
arrows.
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Figure 6: Full Network graph of Citigroup (C) graphically highlighting risk drivers and risk recipients directly connected to Citigroup with
bold arrows. Arrows, colors and acronyms are as in Figure 5.
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Figure 7: Full Network graph of Morgan Stanley (MS) highlighting risk drivers and risk recipients directly connected to Morgan Stanley with
bold arrows. Arrows, colors and acronyms are as in Figure 5.
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Figure 8: The upper three panels depict time-varying systemic risk beta, time-varying VaR
and the product of the two, standardized systemic risk beta, for American International
Group (AIG). The lower three panels show the respective three time series for Bank of
America (BAC).
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Systemic Risk Impact of LEH & ML before the Crisis
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Figure 9: Standardized systemic risk betas, i.e., the products of estimated systemic risk
betas and individual VaRs, of Lehman Brothers (LEH, green) and Merrill Lynch (ML,
red) during the two years before the financial crisis, mid 2005 - mid 2007. Estimation
period is the pre-crisis period, 2000 - mid 2007.
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Figure 10: Estimated company-specific VaRs of Lehman Brothers (upper panel) and Mer-
rill Lynch (lower panel) during the two years before the financial crisis, mid 2005 - mid
2007. Estimation period is the pre-crisis period, 2000 - mid 2007.
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